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Introduction 
This paper analyses the law of criminal defamation in Azerbaijan Republic (hereinafter 
Azerbaijan), comparing it to international standards of justice and the general practice of a 
number of states.   
  
Laws criminalizing defamation are not a phenomenon throughout the world today. 
Criminal defamation exists in the most economically developed countries such as western 
Europe and the United States.  However, in those developed countries, these laws are 
usually not applied in practice.  
 
Where criminal defamation continues to be applied means to restrict freedom of 
expression. In these jurisdictions, public officials and other powerful individuals use these 
laws as a weapon to intimidate the media from revealing corrupt practices or from 
publicizing incriminating information.  Journalists and the media are pressured not to write 
or broadcast news in order to avoid a criminal law suit. This self-censorship of the media 
negatively affects the public’s right to information. 
 
Criminal defamation laws are just one manner of repressing freedom of expression. When 
criminal defamation is used, other forms of repression also exist, such as censorship, media 
control and intimidation. This takes the form of murder of journalists, physical harassment, 
imprisonment, arrangement of high amount of fine, as well as closing newspapers and 
stopping broadcasting. In addition, failure to diligently investigate or prosecute crimes 
against the media; compulsory government licensing of journalists; or the requirement that 
a journalist reveal anonymous sources can be used as forms of repression.  
 
This practice is common in many countries today, particularly some of the former Soviet 
republics. Today, journalists live and work in quite difficult circumstances in these 
countries. The most widely known examples include the killing in Russia of some 
journalists during the past few months of 2009. They were Anastasiya Baburova , a 
journalist respectively for the independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta,  Sergey Protazanov, 
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a journalist for the newspaper Grazhdanskoye, Shafig Amrakhov, the editor of the online 
regional agency RIA 51,1 as well as  Natalya Estemirova, human rights defender.2  
 
Unfortunately the same situation exists in Azerbaijan. Since 2005 the enjoyment of the 
freedom of expression has declined. In 2005, one journalist was killed and the perpetrators 
of the crime still have not been found and convicted. As a result of this impunity, many 
attacks, kidnappings, and physical harassments have been committed against several 
journalists during the last four years. In addition, tens of journalists have been arrested for 
defamation as well as for other criminal acts such as hooliganism, use of narcotics, etc. All 
these journalists have been in opposition to the government. 
 
In this paper I will explore the ways in which criminal defamation is a gateway for the 
destruction of the freedom of expression and the interrelated freedom to receive 
information.  The first chapter explains the importance of freedom of expression in a 
democratic society, the circumstances in which the freedom can be restricted. The first 
chapter will also discuss the legal doctrine of defamation, its forms and elements, and its 
defences. The second chapter presents the criminal defamation, comparative domestic 
practices and implementation mechanisms. The last chapter is devoted to the contemporary 
situation in Azerbaijan, including court experiences with criminal defamation. At the end, I 
will conclude the real and necessary measures that the Azerbaijani government must take 
with criminal defamation in order to improve the enjoyment of the freedom of expression.  
 
                                                 
1 See at http://www3.signonsandiego.com/stories/2009/sep/15/eu-russia-slain-journalists-091509/ 
2 See at http://www.englishpen.org/writersinprison/bulletins/russiafourjournalistskilledin2009/ 
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CHAPTER 1 
1.1. Freedom of expression.  
 
Freedom of expression is a cornerstone of democratic rights and freedoms. This is the 
guarantee of all other rights and freedoms. Without a broad guarantee of the right to 
freedom of expression protected by independent and impartial courts, there is no free 
country, there is no democracy. This general proposition is undeniable.3  
 
Freedom of expression is the most important of the rights guaranteed by all important 
international conventions such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),4 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),5 European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR),6 the American Convention on Human Rights,7 African Charter 
on Human and Peoples' Rights.8  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is generally considered to be the 
flagship statement of international human rights, binding on all States as a matter of 
customary international law. It guarantees the right to freedom of expression in the 
following terms: 
                                                 
3 Jochen Abr. Frowein, “Freedom of expression under the European Convention on Human Rights”, in 
Monitor/Inf (97) 3, Council of Europe  
4 See UDHR, Article 19 
5 See ICCPR, Article 20 
6 See ECHR, Article 10  
7 See ACHR, Article 13 
8 See ACHPR, Article 19 
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Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes the 
right to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is an international 
treaty, ratified by over 145 States, which imposes legally binding obligations on States 
Parties to respect a number of the human rights set out in the UDHR.  
In its very first session in 1946 the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 
59(I) which stated, “Freedom of information is a fundamental human right and ... the 
touchstone of all the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated.”  
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has always paid crucial attention to the 
Right to Freedom of expression. In Handyside v. United Kingdom it recognized the 
importance of freedom of expression by stressing that this right is the foundation of a 
democratic society.9 
The Court has reiterated its definitive statement at least four times since 2000. 10 
 
The guarantee of freedom of expression particularly applies to the media, including the 
broadcast media and public service broadcasting organizations. As the US Supreme Court 
has noted, “speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of 
self-government.”11 International Courts have considered several cases on this matter. For 
instance, one of its cases, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights stated: “It is the mass 
media that make the exercise of freedom of expression a reality”12.  
 
                                                 
9 ECtHR, Handyside v. United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, 1 EHRR 737, para. 49. 
10 ECtHR, Lingens v. Austria, 1986; Sener v. Turkey, 2000; Thoma v. Luxembourg, 2001; Maronek v. 
Slovakia, 2001; Dichand and Others v. Austria, 2002, etc.  
11 Garrison v. Louisiana 379 US 64 (1964) at 74-5 
12 IACHR, Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, 
Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of 13 November 1985, Series A, No. 5, para. 34. 
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Article 10 of the ECHR does not explicitly mention the freedom of press. However, the 
Court has developed extensive case-law providing a body of principals and rules granting 
the press, a special status in the enjoyment of freedoms contained an Article 10. The role of 
the press as political watchdog was first highlighted by the Court in the Lingens case.13 The 
Court underlined the importance of freedom of the press in the political debate: 
 
… These principles are of particular importance as far as the press is concerned. 
While the press must not overstep the bounds set, inter alia, for the “protection of the 
reputation of others”, it is nevertheless incumbent on it to impart information and 
ideas on political issues just as on those in other areas of public interest. Not only 
does the press have the task of imparting such information and ideas: the public also 
has a right to receive them. In this connection, the Court cannot accept the opinion, 
expressed in the judgment of the Vienna Court of Appeal, to the effect that the task of 
the press was to impart information, the interpretation of which had to be left 
primarily to the reader … 
 
In the same judgment the Court decided that: 
 
Freedom of the press affords the public one of the best means of discovering and 
forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of political leaders and consequently, 
the freedom of political debate is at the very core of the concept of a democratic 
society. This is why the Court affords political debate by the press a very strong 
protection under Article 10. 
 
The ECtHR also consistently acknowledged that the press has a unique position under 
Article 10 ECHR. It has ruled that the press has not only a right but a duty to impart 
information and ideas on all matters of political and public interest, which the public has a 
                                                 
13 ECtHR, Lingens v. Austria, 1986; Strasbourg, France. 
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corresponding right to receive.14 This extends to interpretation of the facts which is not 
simply to be left to the reader.15 The role of the press as public watchdog is ‘essential in a 
democratic society’.16  
This issue is paid an essential attention by Inter-American Court as well. According to 
Inter-American Court, freedom of expression requires that “the communication media are 
potentially open to all without discrimination or, more precisely, that there be no 
individuals or groups that are excluded from access to such media.”17 
In addition, Article 2 of the ICCPR emphasize that all member states have an obligation “to 
adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights” 
recognized in the Covenant.   This article obliges states not only to refrain from interfering 
with rights, but also to take positive steps to ensure those rights, including freedom of 
expression. Thus, governments are obliged to create an environment in which an 
independent media can develop and satisfy the public’s right to know.  
1.2. Restrictions on freedom of expression: ‘necessary in a democratic 
society’ 
Freedom of expression is not an absolute right and it can be restricted. It is envisaged in 
some international conventions on Human Rights. For instance, according to Article 19(3) 
of ICCPR:  
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it 
special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, 
but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:  
                                                 
14 Andrew Nicol QC, Gavin Millar QC & Andrew Sharland, Media Law & Human Rights, Blackstone Press 
Limited 2001 
15 ECtHR, Sunday Times v United Kongdom (1997) 2 EHHR 245, para. 65 and Lingsen v Austria, para. 41 
16 EctHR, De Haes & Gijsels v Belgium (1997) 25 EHRR 1, para. 37 
17 Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, note 10, 
para. 34. 
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(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;  
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of 
public health or morals.  
The similar provision is envisaged in ECHR. Article 10 (2) of ECHR also restricts the 
freedom of expression. Article 10 (2) says:  
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may 
be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed 
by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the rights of 
others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
 
According to the ECtHR’s experience, the national authorities are not required to interfere 
with the exercise of freedom of expression every time one of the grounds enumerated by 
paragraph 2 is at stake, as this would lead to a limitation of the content of this right. For 
instance, damaging one’s reputation or honor must not be seen as criminal and/or requiring 
civil redress in all cases. Similarly, public expression putting at risk the authority of the 
judiciary must not be punished each time such a criticism occurs. In other words, the public 
authorities have only the possibility and not the obligation to order and/or enforce a 
restrictive or punitive measure to the exercise of the right to freedom of expression.  
 
Moreover, when a state restricts the freedom of expression and arranges a penalty for the 
expression which violates others rights or damages the security in the country, the nature 
and severity of the penalties are to be taken into account. In Okcuoglu v Turkey, the Court 
found that the conviction and the sentencing of the applicant were contrary to Article 10 
from proportionality of the interference point of view.18 Even where the criminal penalties 
consisted in relatively small fines, the Court held against such penalties as they could play 
                                                 
18 ECtHR, Okçuoğlu v. Turkey, 1999. 
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the role of an implicit censorship. In other cases where journalists were fined, the Court 
stressed: “…although the penalty imposed on the author did not strictly speaking prevent 
him from expressing himself, it nonetheless amounted to a kind of censure, which would be 
likely to discourage him from making criticism of that kind again in future. In the context of 
the political debate such a sentence would be likely to deter journalists from contributing 
to public discussion of issues affecting the life of the community. By the same token, a 
sanction such as this is liable to hamper the press in performing its tasks as purveyor of 
information and public watchdog.19  
Freedom of expression can be restricted by the state in order to protect others’ honor and 
reputation as well. From this point of view the right to freedom of expression can be 
considered a problematic right due to presenting conflicts between two well-established 
rights: freedom of expression and the right to reputation.20 The right to reputation has a 
much longer history than the right to freedom of expression; reputation has been highly 
prized and strongly protected for centuries.21 In most countries great importance is still 
attached to individual reputation, though it is less highly valued in many liberal societies, 
like the US. Until recently, reputation was regarded as one of the fundamental liberties 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights22 and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights23 recognize the right to legal protection against 
attacks on individual honor and reputation, as well as against interference with privacy. 
In the United States and to a lesser extend many common law jurisdictions, the clear trend 
in last few decades has been to give increasing protection to freedom of speech to the cost 
of rights or interests in reputation or privacy.24 Courts have accepted, for example, that the 
                                                 
19 ECtHR, Lingens v. Austria, 1986; Barthold v. the Federal Republic of Germany, 1985. 
20 Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech, Oxford University Press 2005 
21 Reputation was proected in Roman Law 
22 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 12 
23 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 17 
24 Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech, Oxford University Press 2005  
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press and other media have a right to publish defamatory allegations about the conduct of 
politicians and other leading figures, insofar as these stories are of public interest, provided 
that – to simplify at this point – the media have not disclosed them irresponsibly. Equally, 
courts may allow the press freedom in some circumstances to disclose the details of the 
private lives of celebrities, taking the view that freedom of speech and of the press trumps 
any competing privacy rights.    
The ECtHR’ approach to the defamation cases differs from state to state and in some cases 
the Court applies the margin of appreciation. It observed, in the context of defamation, that:  
…Perceptions as to what would be appropriate response by society to speech which 
does not … enjoy the protection of Article 10 … may differ greatly from one state to 
another… 
so that contracting states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in determining the 
appropriate responses.25 These may include measures allowing the courts to enforce ‘right 
to reply’. In Ediciones Tiempo SA v Spain,26 the Commission emphasized that ‘in a 
democratic society the right of reply is a guarantee of the pluralism of information which 
must be respected’. In the same case the Court observed that: … the purpose of the 
regulations governing the right of reply was to safeguard the interest of the public in 
receiving information from variety of sources and thereby to guarantee the fullest possible 
access to information… 
  
The Court has also consistently referred to the theoretical basis for the protection of 
freedom of expression articulated in Handyside v UK,27 in the context of restrictions and 
penalties in the law of defamation, namely that: 
 
… freedom of expression, as secured in paragraph 1 of Article 10, constitutes one of 
the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for 
                                                 
25 ECtHR, Tolstoy Molivslavsky v UK, 1995, 20 EHRR 442, para. 48 
26 ECtHR, Ediciones Tiempo SA v Spain, 1989  
27 ECtHR, Handyside v UK, 1976 
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its progress and for each individual’s self-fulfillment. Subject to paragraph 2, it is 
applicable not only ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favorably received or regarded 
as inoffensive or a matter of indifference, but also those that offend, shock or disturb. 
Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without 
which there is no ‘democratic society’   
Because of this the ‘necessity for any restrictions to be convincingly established’ has been 
restated a number of times in the context of defamation.28 
1.3.1. What is Defamation?  
There are different notions on defamation. In general, the definition of defamation varies 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but “one of the common agreements that a communication 
that is merely unflattering, annoying, irksome, or embarrassing, or that hurts only the 
plaintiff’s feelings, is not actionable.”29  
Another common direction is that defamatory allegation is one that tends to make 
reasonable people think the worse of the plaintiff.30 Other definitions refer to “words which 
cause a person to be shunned and avoided”.31 This would include allegations which carry 
no moral blame but which might make people avoid the plaintiff. For instance, in 
Youssupoff v. MGM Pictures Ltd,32 Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff was raped was 
defamatory because it would prejudice her chances of “receiving respectable consideration 
from the world”. The concept of defamation by exposure to “ridicule”, from the least 
satisfactory definition of “hatred, ridicule and contempt” has received the approval of the 
Court of Appeal.33 
                                                 
28 ECtHR, Lingens v Austria, 1986 
29 Robert D. Sack, Sack on Defamation: Libel, Slander and Related Problems 2–9 (1999). 
30 Sim v. Stretch (1936) 52 T.L.R. 669. Tolley v. J.S. Fry and Sons LTD (1931) A.C. 333  
31 Id.  
32 Youssupoff v. MGM Pictures Ltd (1934) 50 T.L.R. 581, UK 
33 David Price Law, Procedure & Practice London Sweet & Maxwell 1997 
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In general, defamation is a public communication that tends to injure the reputation of 
another. It has been treated by the modern law as of two kinds: written and oral. In most 
cases written defamation is called libel, and oral defamation is called slander. According to 
some authors, 34 the use of the term slander is not, etymologically correct, in accordance 
with ancient authorities; but the distinction itself is unknown in the old books and 
abridgments; and it is more convenient to give to written defamation and spoken 
defamation those arbitrary titles which usage has now fully established.  
 
Defamation, in the Common Law world is a civil wrong or tort. It is a special sort of wrong 
in that it does not need to involve the threat or actuality of any physical harm being 
suffered by the victim. It is a tort which occurs where A says to another or others, 
something about B which is false and derogatory and which does harm B’s reputation. 
Defamation is a wrong for which virtually all legal systems provide redress. Generally this 
redress is available through private law actions taken by whoever claims they have been 
defamed. Defamation can also be a crime, as well as being a civil wrong.35  
1.3.1. a. English defamation law 
Modern libel and slander laws as implemented in many (but not all) Commonwealth 
nations as well as in the United States and in the Republic of Ireland, are originally 
descended from English defamation law.  
It is not easy to explain or understand the English common law of defamation.36 As a 
leading U.K. commentator stated, “the law of defamation is notoriously complex.” Its 
complexity comes from numerous detailed and technical rules, which stem from the 
                                                 
34 George Wingrove Cooke, ESQ., Law of Defamation: with forms of pleadings, Philadelphia: T. & J. W. 
Johnson 
35 H.L.Fu, Richard Cullen Media Law in PRC Asia Law & Practice 1992 
36 Weaver, Russell L. and others, Defamation law and free speech: Reynolds v. Times Newspapers and the 
English media, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, November 1, 2004 
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common law as well as from recent developments. In addition, the English common law of 
defamation was altered by the 1952 Defamation Act and the 1996 Defamation Act, as well 
as by the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which has 
been incorporated into U.K. law through the 1998 Human Rights Act.  
Until recently English common law refused to recognize a defense of qualified privilege to 
defamation actions37 brought in respect of communications to the general public of 
inaccurate information.   
1.3.1. b. The United States defamation law 
Until the landmark ruling in New York Times v Sullivan,38 the United States Suprme 
Court’s view on defamation was that an attack on an individual’s reputation did not 
contribute to public discussion, but was rather to be equated with an assault.39 A 
defamatory attack on the conduct of a public official – an Alabama Commissioner of police 
– was held to be a form of political speech, the protection of which is the principal concern 
of the First Amendment.40 As a result, the claimant could not bring a libel action unless 
malice was proved. The crucial step in the Court’s reasoning was the analogy drawn 
between this type of libel and the offence of sedition, which, in the Court’s view, would 
                                                 
37 See Chapter 1.3.6.(e)2. 
38 376 US 254 (1964) (Sullivan was a police comissioner in Montgomery Country, in Alabama. He sued the 
New York Times after it published an advertisement charging that his police department had violated the civil 
rights of many black people in its jurisdiction at the height of civil rights movement in the US. Sullivan was 
not identified by name in the advertisement.)   
39 Chaplinsky v New Hapmshire 315 US 568 (1942) 
40 The First Amendment of the United States Constitution protects the right to freedom of religion and 
freedom of expression from government interference. See U.S. Const. amend. I. Freedom of expression 
consists of the rights to freedom of speech, press, assembly and to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances, and the implied rights of association and belief. The Supreme Court interprets the extent of the 
protection afforded to these rights. The First Amendment has been interpreted by the Court as applying to the 
entire federal government even though it is only expressly applicable to Congress. Furthermore, the Court has 
interpreted, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting the rights in the First 
Amendment from interference by state governments. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 
 15
clearly be outlawed by the Amendment. If that analogy were correct, it would inevitably 
follow that at least some libels are covered by a free speech clause.41 Consequently, in 
deciding where the balance should lie between allowing persons to protect their reputation 
and protecting rights of freedom of expression and freedom of the press, the First 
Amendment was invoked to argue that that balance must favour freedom of the press.  
 
The New York Times case and subsequent cases have established that public officers 
(widely defined) and public figures (for example, film stars), who are engaged in public or 
official activities (or activities relevant to those activities), can only sue successfully in 
defamation if they can prove both actual damage and actual malice with convincing 
clarity.42 In fact it is almost impossible for most public officials and public figures to obtain 
a remedy in a defamation action in the US. This is the case even when the published 
statement contains false facts. Factual falsity does not found a cause of action unless the 
person publishing the statement knew the facts were false or showed reckless disregard as 
to whether they were false or not. Mere failure to investigate the truth of the statement is 
not enough to establish malice.43     
 
Several arguments have been put forward to justify this dramatic change in the law. First, it 
is said that public officials and public figures assume the risk of unfavorable publicity 
when they decide to enter the limelight. Second, it is said that it is better for free speech to 
be over protected in order to assure it is not under protected. Third, the press is said to 
enjoy a unique position in a democracy which deserves special protection.44 
 
Defamation actions are available in the US under the usual rules for those who are not 
public officials or public figures. Those in the latter categories must live with the reality 
                                                 
41 Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech, Oxford University Press 2005 
42 Scauer, Fredrick, “Social Foundations of the Law of Defamation: A comparative Analysis”, in (Barendt, 
Eric. (ed) Media Law (Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1993) 264 
43 Id. 
44 Id 268 and 278 
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that the media enjoys an especially privileged position in the US. The outcome of the New 
York Times case and those following it buttress the clearly identified role of the media as 
the fourth branch of government in the US.   
1.3.2. Slander and Libel  
There are two distinct forms of defamation: libel and slander. Libel is the publication of 
defamatory matter in permanent form. Most commonly, but not exclusively, libel is in 
writing and slander is spoken. According to the section 1 of the 1952 English Defamation 
Act, defamatory broadcasts are treated a libel.45 The same provision is constituted with 
respect to performances on stage by virtue of section 4(1) Theatres act 1968. Films, records 
and tapes are all considered to be in permanent form. Most publications on electronic 
media, such as the internet and e-mail have sufficient permanence to be considered libel. 
Even though the words appear on a screen they are not stored, in which case it is likely to 
be considered a slander.46 
Defamatory matter communicated by word of mouth is slander except, arguably, when the 
speaker is reciting from a document.47 Defamatory gestures and conduct are slanders.  
In slander actions there is an additional burden on the plaintiff which reflects the fact that 
the libel is more durable and therefore more likely to damage reputation. 
1.3.3. Elements of Defamation  
Broadly there are four elements that the plaintiff is required to prove in a defamation 
lawsuit, whether for libel or slander. These are as follows: 
1. The statement, which must be about another person, must be false.  
                                                 
45 See Defamation act 1952, Section 1  
46 David Price Law, Procedure & Practice London Sweet & Maxwell 1997 
47 Longdon-Griffiths v. Smith (1950), Osborn v. Thomas Boulter (1930) 
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2. The statement must be ‘published’ to a third party, who cannot also be the person 
who is being defamed. Publishing in this context does not mean that it must be 
printed, but purely that the statement has to be ‘made available’ to someone other 
than the person about whom the statement was made.  
3. If the nature of the statement is ‘of public concern’ the person who has published it 
must be at least liable in negligence.  
4. The person about whom the defamatory statement is made must be ‘damaged’ by 
the statement. In some states, it is sufficient to establish that the plaintiff suffered 
‘mental anguish’ as opposed to ‘damage.’48 
Defamation per se 
Some statements are so defamatory that they are considered defamation per se; and the 
plaintiff does not have to prove that the statements harmed his reputation. The classic 
examples of defamation per se are allegations of serious sexual misconduct; allegations of 
serious criminal misbehavior; or allegations that a person is afflicted with a loathsome 
disease. The historical examples of loathsome diseases are leprosy and venereal diseases.  
When a plaintiff is able to prove defamation per se, damages are presumed, but the 
presumption is rebuttable. 
Typically, the following may constitute defamation per se:49 
• Attacks on a person's professional character or standing; 
• Allegations that an unmarried person is unchaste; 
• Allegations that a person is infected with a sexually transmitted disease; 
• Allegations that the person has committed a crime of moral turpitude; 
                                                 
48 H.L.Fu, Richard Cullen, Media Law in PRC, Asia Law & Practice 1992 
49 Larson, Aaron, Defamation, Libel and Slander Law, Law Offices of Aaron Larson, August, 2003, 
published in: http://www.expertlaw.com/library/personal_injury/defamation.html  
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1.3.4. The defamatory statement: What the plaintiff must prove 
The consideration of the meaning of the statement is one of the most important issues of 
the defamation. The statement or publication which is the subject of a defamation action 
will consist of words, be they may be written, spoken, broadcast or transmitted 
electronically. Words are the essence of defamation and the plaintiff must in his statement 
of claim set out the words of which he complains. Where the plaintiff is unable to ascertain 
the words with reasonable precision his action will fail. The difficulty of words is that they 
can mean different things to different people and the context and manner in which they are 
published will affect the meaning.50  
 
However, words which merely cause injured feelings or annoyance but do not reflect on 
reputation are not defamatory. A person may be upset to hear that he or she has died but it 
is not defamatory.51 To use a person’s name without his or her authority for the purpose of 
an advert is not of itself defamatory, although it may give rise to liability in overtaking.52  
 
In order to establish a cause of action in defamation, a plaintiff must prove that the 
defendant has published or is responsible for the publication of defamatory material which 
is understood to refer to him. Publication is an essential ingredient of defamation.53 
However defamatory a person’s thoughts may be, they will cause no damage to anyone’s 
reputation unless communicated to another. In deciding where something is published there 
is a distinction to be made between the act of publication and the fact of communication to 
a third party, but even that distinction may not suffice to reveal all the considerations 
relevant to locate the place of the tort of defamation.54 Whether or not a case can be 
                                                 
50 Price, David, Law, Procedure & Practice, London Sweet & Maxwell 1997 
51 Samules v. Evening Mail (1875) 6, Hun. (N.Y,) R.5.  
52 Price, David, Law, Procedure & Practice, London Sweet & Maxwell 1997 
53 Mathias Klang and Andrew Murray Human Rights in the Digital Age, 2005, p 61 
54 Dow Jones & Co v Cutnick [2002] HCA 56, para. 11 
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brought in a particular jurisdiction will depend, inter alia, on where the damage occurs and 
also whether there has been a publication in that state.55 
According to English defamation law there is no obligation on the plaintiff to prove the 
allegation is false in order to establish a cause of action in defamation. However, he or she 
must nevertheless anticipate the evidence on which he or she could rely in order to 
demonstrate its falsity if there is a prospect that the defendant will seek to prove that it is 
true. Similarly, the plaintiff needs not prove that the defendant was malicious in order to 
establish that he or she has been defamed. But, where the defendant proves that the 
publication is fair comment or was made on an occasion of qualified privilege, the plaintiff 
must prove malice56 in order to defeat the defense and win the action. Finally, when the 
plaintiff technically has a cause of action and there is no defense, if the action lacks any 
real merit, it may not be worth pursuing.57 
Defamation law in the United States is much less plaintiff-friendly than its counterparts in 
European and the Commonwealth countries, due to the enforcement of the First 
Amendment.58 Criminal libel is rarely prosecuted but exists on the books in many states, 
and is constitutionally permitted in circumstances essentially identical to those where civil 
libels liability is constitutional. Defenses to libel that can result in dismissal before trial 
include the statement being one of opinion rather than fact or being “fair comment and 
criticism,” though neither of these are imperatives on the US constitution. Truth is currently 
almost always a defense. 
                                                 
55 Shevill and Others v Presse Alliance SA [1995] All ER (EC) 289 
56 Malice is a term of art meaning a dominant improper motive. In order to establish malice it is generally 
necessary to demonstrate that the defendant published the statement knowing it to be false or without caring 
whether it was true or false, i.e. recklessly.  
57 Id p: 4  
58 See para. 1.3.1.a.  
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Most states recognize that some categories of statements are considered to be defamatory 
per se, such that people making a defamation claim for these statements do not need to 
prove that the statement was defamatory.  
1.3.5. Defenses to Defamation   
In defamation cases it is important to take into consideration not only the four elements of 
defamation that must be proven, but also be prepared for the defenses that may be used to 
dismiss a case. According to David Price,59 the defendant must overcome four hurdles in 
order to establish the defense: 
1. the statement must be comment but not fact; 
2. the comment must have a sufficient factual basis (that is the comment must be 
based on facts which are themselves true); 
3. the comment must be one which a “fair minded” man could honestly hold. This is 
an objective test; 
4. the subject matter of the comment must be a matter of public interest.  
Where these are surmounted, the defense will succeed unless the plaintiff proves that the 
comment was maliciously published.  
 
In general, the following forms of defense have been differed: 
 
(a) Justification.   
A claim of defamation is defeated if the defendant proves that the statement was true. If the 
defense fails, a court may treat any material produced by the defense to substantiate it, and 
any ensuing media coverage, as factors aggravating the libel and increasing the damages. A 
                                                 
59 David Price Law, Procedure & Practice London Sweet & Maxwell 1997 
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statement quoting another person cannot be justified merely by proving that the other 
person had also made the statement: the substance of the allegation must be proved.60  
(b) Fair Comment 
According to some authors,61 the defamatory statement is an opinion, based on true facts, 
which an honest person could hold in relation to a matter of public interest. A comment 
made which though defamatory is not actionable as it is an opinion on a matter of public 
interest. The fact that the opinion is exaggerated, prejudiced, obstinate, and wrong is not a 
bar to the defense succeeding. The liberty of the defense is justified on the basis that 
readers can recognize an opinion as the subjective view of the publisher or author and make 
up their own mind about whether to accept it.62 Statements of the fact, in contrast, are 
considered more damaging because they are more likely to be accepted at face value.  
Different authors have given different definition to fair comments. According to some 
authors,63 “... a defense to an action of libel or slander that the words complained of is fair 
comment on a matter of public interest. The right of fair comment is one of the 
fundamental rights of free speech and writing .. and it is of vital importance to the rule of 
law on which we depend for our personal freedom. The right is a bulwark of free speech. ... 
There are matters on which the public has a legitimate interest or with which it is 
legitimately concerned and on such matters, it is desirable that all should be able to 
comment freely and even harshly, so long as they do so honestly and without malice.” 
In Canadian Law,64 author R. Brown stresses the following trends: “Everyone is entitled to 
comment fairly on matters of public interest. … Such comments are protected by a 
qualified privilege if they are found to be comments and not statements of fact, and are 
made honestly, and in good faith, about facts which are true on a matter of public interest. 
A comment is the subjective expression of opinion in the form of a deduction, inference, 
                                                 
60 ”Defamation - libel and slander”. The Liberty Guide to Human Rights. Liberty. 2002-10-21. 
61 Price, David, Defamation, Law, Procedure & Practice, London, Sweet and Maxwell 1997   
62 Kemsley v. Foot, 1952, A.C. 345, Lord of House, The United Kingdom 
63 Price, David, Defamation, Law, Procedure & Practice, London, Sweet and Maxwell 1997   
64 Brown, R., The Law of Defamation in Canada, Toronto: Carswell, 2007 
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conclusion, criticism, judgment, remark or observation which is generally incapable of 
proof. In order to be fair, it must be shown that the facts upon which the comment is based 
are truly stated and that the comment is an honest expression of the publisher’s opinion 
relating to those facts. Where a comment imputes evil, base or corrupt motives to a person, 
it must be shown that such imputations are warranted by, and could reasonably be drawn 
from those facts. … The comment must be made on a matter of public interest. It could be 
of public interest because of the importance of the person about whom the comment is 
made, or because of the event, occasion or circumstances that give rise to the opinion. The 
protection may be lost if it is shown that the comment was made maliciously, in the sense 
that it originated from some improper or indirect motive, or if there was no reasonable 
relationship between the comment that was made and the public interest that it was 
designed to serve. ... it is a defense to an action for libel or slander if the words used are fair 
comment on a matter of public interest.” 
 
Lord Denning, in London Artists Ltd. v. Littler,65 added: “In order to be fair, the 
commentator must get his basic facts right. The basic facts are those which go to the pith 
and substance of the matter.”  
 
In Makow v Winnipeg Sun,66 Justice Monnin wrote: “Everyone has a right to comment on 
matters of public interest provided he does so fairly and honestly and such comment, 
however severe, is not actionable. … In order to be successful, the defendants must meet 
the following criteria: the words objected to must be comment and not statement of 
fact; the comment must be fair; (and) the comment must be on a matter of public interest.” 
                                                 
65 London Artists v Littler 1969 2 QB 375 (England)  
66 Makow v Winnipeg Sun2003 MBQB 56, published at 
canlii.org/en/mb/mbqb/doc/2003/2003mbqb56/2003mbqb56.html; appeal at 
canlii.org/en/mb/mbca/doc/2004/2004mbca41/2004mbca41.html 
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In Creative Salmon Co. v Staniford,67 Justice Gerow states these words: “To be fair, a 
comment must be based on facts truly stated and must not contain imputations of corrupt or 
dishonorable motives on the person whose conduct is criticized, save insofar as such 
imputations are warranted by the facts. Another necessary ingredient of the defense of fair 
comment is that the person making the statement must have an honest belief in the truth of 
the comment. … The onus is on Mr. Staniford (the Defendant) to prove that the statements 
were made honestly and fairly. In order to do so, he must satisfy both a subjective and 
objective test: subjective honesty of belief in the defamatory statement, that is, the 
comment is one which a fair minded person would honestly make on the facts proved; and 
objective fairness, in the sense that the comment is one which a person could honestly 
make on the basis of all the facts known to the defendant.” 
(c) Unintentional Defamation  
In cases of unintentional and non-negligent defamations, a defendant may avoid liability to 
pay damages if he is willing to publish a reasonable correction and apology and to pay the 
plaintiff's costs and expenses reasonably incurred as a consequence of the publication in 
question (e.g. costs of consulting a solicitor, obtaining Counsel's opinion etc.)68 
(d) Privileges  
The law of defamation must balance the competing interests of freedom of speech and 
protection of reputation. There is no difficulty where the publication in question is true – 
freedom to disseminate the truth must overweigh the protection of an undeserved 
reputation. However, in certain circumstances, the law recognizes that it is better that 
individuals are free to speak their mind (and others to report what they say) without fear of 
                                                 
67 Creative Salmon Company Ltd. v. Staniford,2007 BCSC 62, published at 
canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2007/2007bcsc62/2007bcsc62.html 
68 David Price Law, Procedure & Practice London Sweet & Maxwell 1997 
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being sued even if they get it wrong and the plaintiff’s reputation is damaged. This is the 
rational behind the defense of privilege.69  
(d) 1. Absolute privilege   
An absolute privilege protects the speaker or publisher from any liability for defamation; 
the privilege is also referred to as “absolute immunity” because the speaker is immunized 
from liability. The doctrine of absolute privilege arose from the theory that there are certain 
circumstances in which the ability to speak freely — usually in the context of governmental 
functions — is so important that it outweighs the interest that an individual has in his or her 
reputation. There can be no investigation into whether remarks made in a situation of 
absolute privilege are defamatory. The purpose of the absolute privilege is to guard persons 
acting honestly in the discharge of a public function, or in the defense of their rights, from 
being harassed by actions imputing to them dishonesty and malice. There are three broad 
common law categories of absolute privilege: statements made in the course of judicial or 
quasi-judicial proceedings; statements made in the course of parliamentary proceedings; 
and communications concerning matters of state.  
If the defendant's comments were made in Parliament, or under oath in a court of law, they 
are entitled to absolute privilege.  
The recognized core of absolute privilege applies to everything that is said in a judicial 
proceeding by witnesses, prosecutors and by judges. Absolute privilege attaches to 
everything that is said in the course of proceedings by judges, parties, counsel and 
witnesses, with such protection extending to the contents of documents submitted as 
evidence.70 In this regard, it is said that words “spoken in office ... in the course of any 
proceedings before any court recognized by law ... though the words were written or 
spoken maliciously, without any justification or excuse, and from personal ill-will or anger 
                                                 
69 Id. 
70 Lincoln v Daniels, 1962, UK 
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against the party defamed”71 are not subject to an action in defamation. Secondly, absolute 
privilege extends to everything that is done from the inception of the proceedings onwards, 
and includes all pleadings and other documents brought into existence for the purpose of 
the proceedings. 
It is essential to the ends of justice that all persons participating in judicial proceedings 
should enjoy freedom of speech in the discharge of their public duties or in pursuing their 
rights, without fear of consequences. It is desirable that persons who occupy certain 
positions, as judges, jurors, advocates, or litigants, should be perfectly free and 
independent, and that to secure their independence, their utterances should not be brought 
before civil tribunals for inquiry on the mere allegation that they are malicious. 
(d) 2. Qualified privilege 
Statements or publications protected by qualified privilege can be broadly divided into two 
categories:  
1. where the statement in question is (a) made by a person who has (i) “a duty” to 
make a statement or (ii) “an interest” in making the statement; and (b) the recipient 
or recipients of the statement (“the publishees”) have a duty or interest in receiving 
it. 
2. Fair and accurate reports of curtain proceedings, documents and statements.  
The duty or interest which generates qualified privilege may be legal, commercial, social or 
moral. These concepts are merely a way of identifying circumstances where it is felt to be 
in the public interest that defendants should be free to speak their mind, even if they 
publish false and defamatory statements.72   
                                                 
71 Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society v Parkinson, 1892, UK 
72 David Price Law, Procedure & Practice London Sweet & Maxwell 1997 
 
 26
(e) Fact or Opinion  
In many cases the distinction between a statement of fact and opinion is difficult. In 
characterizing a statement, courts must look at it not as lawyers and judges but by placing 
themselves in the position of the hearer or reader, and determine the sense or meaning of 
the statement according to its natural and popular construction. In short, the measure is not 
the effect of the statement on a mind trained in the law, but by the natural and probable 
effect upon the mind of the average reader.73 Accordingly, what constitutes a statement of 
fact in one context may be treated as a statement of opinion in another, in light of the nature 
and content of the communication taken as a whole.74  
 
To determine whether an alleged defamatory statement is one of fact or of opinion it is 
necessary to find out first, the language of the statement is examined. For words to be 
defamatory, they must be understood in a defamatory sense. Where the language of the 
statement is ‘cautiously phrased in terms of apparency,’ the statement is less likely to be 
reasonably understood as a statement of fact rather than opinion. Next, the context in which 
the statement was made must be considered. Since a word is not a crystal, transparent and 
unchanged, but is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content 
according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used, the facts surrounding the 
publication must also be carefully considered. 
 
From this point of view, the courts are to look at the nature and full content of the 
communication and to the knowledge and understanding of the audience to whom the 
publication was directed. The publication in question must be considered in its entirety; ‘it 
may not be divided into segments and each portion treated as a separate unit. It must be 
read as a whole in order to understand its import and the effect which it was calculated to 
have on the reader, and construed in the light of the whole scope and apparent object of the 
writer, considering not only the actual language used, but the sense and meaning which 
                                                 
73 California Supreme Court, Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 1986 
74 United States Court of Appeals, Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 1976 
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may have been fairly presumed to have been conveyed to those who read it. If the 
publication so construed is not reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning and cannot 
be reasonably understood in the defamatory sense, the statement is not actionable.75  
It is important that careful distinction be drawn between expression in the form of 
statements of facts and the expression of value judgment or opinion. This is because the 
existence of facts can be demonstrated, whereas the truth of value judgments is not 
susceptible of proof.76 This makes it difficult, or sometimes impossible, for a journalist to 
defend himself if this is the test of legality.77 However it is not always impossible to 
determine the distinction and this distinction is important in order to make a decision. The 
cases show that a penalty imposed for expressing an honest value judgment is likely to 
involve the violation of the right to freedom of expression. This practice has been observed 
in numerous cases of the ECtHR. For instance in the case of Schwabe v Austria, the Court 
found a violation of Article 10 of the ECHR, holding that the comparison essentially 
amounted to a value judgment made in good faith which had not exceeded the limits of 
freedom of expression.78 Although the classification of the statement as fact or opinion is a 
matter which comes within the margin of appreciation, the Court has decided cases on its 
own classification of the material.79 Where the statement is considered to be fact, the 
journalist must be permitted to call relevant evidence to try to prove truth.80  
However, it does not mean that Article 10 (2) ECHR can never be successfully invoked 
where there has been a defamatory comment which damages a person’s reputation.81 There 
                                                 
75 California Supreme Court, Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 1986 
76 Nicole, Andrew QC, Millat Gavin QC & Sharland Andrew, Media Law and Human Rights, Blackstone 
Press Limited 2001 
77 ECtHR, Lingens v Austria, 1986 
78 ECtHR, Schwabe v Austria, 1992, para. 34   
79 EctHR, Prager & Oberschlick v Austria, 1995, para. 36  
80 EctHR, Castells v Spain, 1992, para. 48  
81 Nicole, Andrew QC, Millat Gavin QC & Sharland Andrew, Media Law and Human Rights, Blackstone 
Press Limited 2001 
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must still be some established or undisputed factual basis for the expression of the opinion, 
which must be a good faith.82 In Prager & Oberschlick v Austria, the Court was satisfied 
that the journalists had overstepped the mark by reason of the width of their accusations 
which lacked a sufficient factual basis.83 The interference in the form of convictions for 
criminal defamation was not, in this case, considered disproportionate. However, there is 
undoubtedly more scope for a journalist to attack through the expression of opinion.    
In defamation actions it's a general rule that no remedy can be had for a statement that was 
issued in the form of an opinion. In the case of Rose v. Hollinger International, Inc84 the 
trial court dismissed the defamation count, holding the allegedly libelous statements in the 
e-mail were protected expressions of opinion.85 
                                                 
82 ECtHR, Lingens v Austria, 1986, para. 46 and De Haes & Gijels v Belgium, 1997, para. 47  
83 EctHR, Prager & Oberschlick v Austria, 1995, para. 37 
84 Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook Country, Rose v. Hollinger International, May 19, 2008 
85 After a short stint with the Chicago Sun-Times, Thomas Rose in 1998 became the publisher and chief 
executive officer of the Post, an affiliate of the Chicago newspaper. He moved to Israel and worked in that 
position until he was fired on May 25, 2004. Two days later, Bret Stephens, the paper’s editor-in-chief, e-
mailed the editorial staff about the firing. His message read in part: “For those of us who have seen up close 
the damage Tom did to this newspaper, this is a happy event indeed. For those Tom damaged personally, with 
his abusive behavior and bizarre management style, it is happier still. So good riddance, Tom, good riddance. 
You will not be missed.  
“So many of us have been waiting for this day, and fighting for it, that we may be forgiven for thinking that 
Tom’s departure brings our problems to an end. It does not. It will be some time before we can undo the 
damage he has wrought: To our finances, to our reputation, to our business relationships, to our morale, to the 
quality of our editorial product. 
“What we can say is that, with Tom gone, we can begin to address our problems in a rational and purposeful 
way. ...” 
Not surprisingly, Jerusalem Post employees forwarded the e-mail to others, and parts of it eventually were 
published in at least two newspapers. Rose then sued Stephens, the Post, its publisher (Hollinger International 
Inc.) and Chicago Sun-Times Inc., under a variety of theories, including defamation. 
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In Rose, the court affirmed a trial court’s dismissal of a former employee’s libel claim 
against the publisher of The Jerusalem Post on the grounds that the blistering e-mail 
announcing the employee’s departure was protected opinion. 
(f) Public interest 
The condition of public interest, the topic is a matter of public interest is also important 
matter of defense in defamation cases. This means that the subject is one in which the 
public has a reasonable interest - in other words, a right to know. 
This right to know includes matters which are in the public arena, but it does not cover 
matters which are the purely private concerns of an individual. For example, one can 
comment on the way a politician was elected, how he does his job or how he treats his 
staff. But the courts have ruled that the way he treats his wife in the privacy of their home 
is not in the public arena. (You can, of course, report that he beats his wife, but you must 
use another defence, such as truth, against any possible action for defamation.) 
There is a word of warning; however, in some countries, the law states that fair comment 
can be used as a defence only on “matters in the public interest”. This means that the public 
must also benefit from knowing the comment. This is very difficult to prove and therefore 
very limiting to journalists.  
(g) A correction and apology  
This is not, strictly speaking, a defense. In fact, publication of an apology is an admission 
that a mistake has been made and that it was defamatory. However, if a judge or jury later 
finds that the matter was defamatory, the fact that there was a quick apology and correction 
the mistake will mitigate the finding. 
Extreme care should be taken in writing a correction and apology. It is possible, when 
correcting one defamatory statement, to make another. For example, to say that allegations 
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contained in a speech by Mr. Alfa about Mr. Beta were untrue could be calling Mr. Alfa a 
liar.  
Conclusion 
As it is mentioned above, the freedom of expression is not an absolute right and it can be 
restricted in particular circumstances. Free expression can be a defamatory and in case of 
defame, a person who has a defamatory statement must be punished. However, a state 
should take into consideration the above mentioned cases. It means, in particular cases, a 
defamatory statement is allowed within limits and punishment of authors for some 
defamatory statements can be violation of the right to freedom of expression and harm the 
democracy itself.   
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CHAPTER 2 
2.1. Criminal Defamation  
 
There are two forms of defamation laws; Criminal defamation law, and civil defamation 
law. Criminal suits for defamation to remedy damage to a person’s honor and reputation 
should be deemed to be unnecessary in all cases. Civil law suits for defamation combined 
with the right to reply can provide restitutio integrum (full restitution) to victims. Civil 
defamation suits are adjudicated between the parties in civil courts, whereas criminal 
defamation suits are prosecuted by the State as criminal offenses. Otherwise, the primary 
distinction between civil and criminal defamation is in the remedies awarded. The victim’s 
remedy in a civil defamation suit is compensatory damages and perhaps punitive damages. 
A problem that may arise in a civil defamation suit is the award of disproportionate 
damages.86 The formal remedy in criminal libel is incarceration or the payment of a fine to 
the government. A civil defamation suit is less stigmatizing, but stigma and punishment are 
often what the alleged victim is seeking.87 Furthermore, civil defamation suits are not as 
problematic as criminal defamation suits. In civil suits, there is no potential for 
prosecutorial misconduct. As criminal prosecutors exercise considerable discretion in 
determining which complaints to prosecute, criminal defamation laws may be 
inconsistently en-forced, and enforcement may by politically motivated, especially when 
the alleged victim of the statement is a public official or influential person. 
 
                                                 
86 Stokes v. Jamaica, Case 28/04, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 65/04, EA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 at 
396 (2004). 
87 Gregory C. Lisby, No Place in the Law: The Ignominy of Criminal Libel in American Jurisprudence, 9 
Comm. L. & Pol'y 433, 470 (2004). 
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2.2 History of Criminal Defamation 
The roots of modern criminal libel law can be traced to the Roman Empire, where the 
offense could be punished by death.88 By the thirteenth century, an English statute, De 
Scandalis Magnatum (1275, 3 Edw. 1, Stat. West. Prim. C. 34), threatened those who “told 
or published any false News or Tales” with imprisonment. The infamous Court of Star 
Chamber developed common law criminal libel rules in 1488, contemporaneously with the 
development of the printing press. Although originally intended primarily to protect the 
monarchy or the aristocracy from criticism or insult, criminal libel laws also applied to 
nonpolitical defamatory statements about private persons.89  
 
The law governing criminal prosecutions for defamation in England today was enacted in 
1792. Later it was enforced in the American colonies. Many of the U.S. state laws were 
initially enacted in the early to mid-1800s. Meanwhile, in Europe, laws such as the French 
press law of 1881 created criminal penalties for harming the reputation of an individual, as 
well as for insulting the President, judiciary, and others within government. Many countries 
which follow the civil code model adopted similar statutes.90 The rationale supporting 
criminal libel seems counterintuitive to modern sensibilities. At its heart, criminal libel was 
believed to be an essential weapon to avert breaches of the peace, by dueling or 
vigilantism, by those who sought satisfaction for affronts to their honor or dignity. 
“Defamation, either real or supposed, is the cause of most of those combats which no laws 
have yet been able to suppress.”91  
 
                                                 
88 Yanchukova, Elena, “Criminal Defamation and Insult Laws: An Infringement on the Freedom of 
Expression in European and Post-Communist Jurisdictions,” 41 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 861 (2003). 
89 De Libellis Famosis, 5 Coke 125a, 77 Eng. Rep. 250, 251, cited in MLRC Bulletin, “Criminalizing Speech 
About Reputation: The Legacy of Criminal Libel in the U.S. After 
Sullivan and Garrison,” at 1 (March 2003). 
90 Yanchukova, supra note 1, at 863. 
91 Livingston, Edward, “A System of Penal Law for the State of Louisiana,” (1833), cited in Garrison v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, at 68 (1964). 
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Today laws criminalizing defamation are not uncommon throughout the world. Even some 
western European countries as well as some U.S. states still have criminal defamation laws. 
Although they are seldom used, criminal defamation statutes remain on the books in about 
half of U.S. states as well as western European countries.92 In jurisdiction where it is still 
enforced, public officials and other powerful individuals can use these laws as a weapon to 
intimidate the media from revealing corrupt practices or publicizing incriminating 
information. Journalists and the media may be pressured not to write or broadcast news 
because its publication could result in a criminal law suit. This self-censorship of the media 
negatively affects the public’s right to information.93 
2.3. The United States of America’s Experience of Criminal Defamation 
 
The trial of printer John Peter Zenger was the most famous criminal libel prosecution in 
colonial America. Zenger had printed issues of the New York Weekly Journal which 
criticized the colonial governor for removing the Chief Justice after he ruled against him. 
The jury, urged on by Zenger’s lawyer, Andrew Hamilton, disregarded the presiding 
judge’s admonition that the truth of the assertion was no defense to the charge, and 
acquitted Zenger.94 After independence, the Sedition Act of 1798 made it a federal crime to 
publish false, scandalous and malicious writings about the government, Congress, or the 
President. Although the Act expired in 1801, it was not until 1964, in New York Times v. 
Sullivan. As Justice William Brennan wrote, the need for citizens to be informed in a 
democratic nation is based on “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate 
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open, and that it may well include 
                                                 
92 John D. Zelezny, Communications Law: Liberties, Restraints, and the Modern Media 116 (4th ed. 2004).  
93 Jo M. Pasqualucci, Criminal Defamation and the evolution of the doctrine of freedom of expression in 
international law: comparative jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law, March 2006. 
94 Jane E. Kirtley and others, Criminal Defamation: An “Instrument of Destruction”, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 
USA November 18, 2003 
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vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public 
officials.”95 
 
Yet in the same term, the high court declined to rule that all criminal defamation statutes 
were necessarily unconstitutional. In Garrison v. Louisiana,96 the Supreme Court struck 
down the Louisiana criminal libel statute because it limited the use of truth as a defense, 
and did not require that actual malice – knowledge of falsity, or reckless disregard for the 
truth – be demonstrated, as required in civil cases by Sullivan. Yet Justice Brennan, again 
writing for the Court, acknowledged that “different interests may be involved where purely 
private libels, totally unrelated to public affairs, are concerned.”97 Accordingly, the 
individual states remained free to retain or enact criminal libel laws as long as the statutes 
conform with these constitutional requirements. In the decades following Garrison, sixteen 
states, and the District of Columbia, repealed their criminal libel statutes.98 Courts in other 
states subsequently struck down the laws on constitutional or other grounds. As a result, 
only 17 of 50 states retain criminal libel statutes. In most of those jurisdictions, the laws are 
either limited to private libels, or remain “on the books,” but effectively dormant.99   
 
In general, in many commonwealth and common law countries, prosecutions for criminal 
libel are rare. There have been hardly any prosecutions in England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland in recent years, and in Scotland, there is no criminal libel.100  
 
2.4. The Inter-American Court's Jurisprudence on Criminal Defamation 
  
                                                 
95 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
96 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
97 Id. at 72, n. 8. 
98 MLRC Bulletin, supra note 2, at 12. 
99 Id. at 15. 
100 Nichol, Andrew, “The United Kingdom” in Press Law and Practice, Article 19, London 1993, updated by 
letter of 26 January 1998. 
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The Inter-American Court got positive results in the area of criminal defamation in 2005. 
The Inter-American Court decided three criminal defamation cases in which the applicant 
had been convicted in domestic courts of defaming a public official or person who was 
involved in activities of public interest.101 The Court ruled in each case that criminal 
defamation was not the least restrictive means of limiting freedom of expression so as to 
protect other rights and, therefore, the State had violated the rights of the person convicted 
domestically of criminal defamation.102 In Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, also known as La 
Nación Newspaper Case the Court held that requiring a journalist to prove the truth of 
statements made by third parties was an excessive restriction on the journalist's right to 
freedom of expression,103 and that there is a higher standard of protection for statements 
made about persons whose activities are within the domain of public interest. 104 
 
In Canese v. Paraguay, the Inter-American Court stated that “penal laws are the most 
restrictive and severest means of establishing liability for an unlawful conduct.”105 When 
combined with the Court's statements that the least restrictive means of interference with 
freedom of expression must be used,106 and that a criminal proceeding combined with other 
factors constitutes “an unnecessary and excessive punishment” for statements made in the 
context of a campaign for election,107 one can infer that criminal sanctions for defamation 
                                                 
101 Canese v. Paraguay, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 111, (Aug. 31, 2004); Herrera Ulloa v. Costa 
Rica, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107, (Jul. 2, 2004); Palamara Iribarne v. Chile, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 135, (Nov. 22, 2005). 
102 Jo M. Pasqualucci, Criminal Defamation and the evolution of the doctrine of freedom of expression in 
international law: comparative jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law, March 2006. 
103 Herrera Ulloa, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., PP 132-35. 
104 Id. PP 127-29. 
105 Canese v. Paraguay, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 111, P 104 (Aug. 31, 2004). 
106 Id. P 96. 
107 Id. P 106. The Canese case was decided after the Herrera Ulloa case. The Court did not address the issue 
of the criminalization of crimes against honor in Herrera Ulloa. See Herrera Ulloa, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
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are not a proportionate restriction on freedom of expression in political campaigns. Civil 
defamation suits must suffice to repair damage to reputations in that context. In Canese, a 
former Paraguayan presidential candidate, Richard Canese, had been convicted of criminal 
defamation by Paraguayan courts for statements he made about another candidate during 
the campaign for the presidency of the country.108 During the campaign, Canese accused 
the rival candidate of having enriched himself with the assistance of the former dictator of 
Paraguay.109 In one newspaper interview he stated that the opposing candidate, Wasmosy, 
had “passed from bankruptcy to the most spectacular wealth, thanks to the support from the 
dictator’s family.”110 Wasmosy won the election, becoming the President of Paraguay,111 
and Canese was subsequently convicted in Paraguayan courts of criminal defamation, 
sentenced to two months in prison, fined, and permanently prohibited from leaving the 
country.112 After Canese had lost several domestic appeals, petitioners filed a complaint in 
his favor with the Commission.113 The Commission found that the Paraguayan criminal 
conviction violated the American Convention and recommended to the State that it lift the 
                                                 
108 Canese, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., P 69(7). Canese, an industrial engineer who had researched and written 
books and articles about the Itaipu hydroelectric power plant, had in earlier years been exiled to Holland for 
his opposition to the former Paraguayan dictator Alfredo Stroessner. Id. P 69(1)(2). Canese had also filed 
reports alleging corruption and tax evasion against the company contracted to build the power plant, a 
company that also had been investigated for corrupt practices by the National Congress of Paraguay. Id. P 
69(3). 
109 Id. P 69(7). Canese was a candidate in the 1993 Paraguayan presidential election opposing Juan Carlos 
Wasmosy, the chairman of the board of the Paraguayan company that had constructed the Itaipu project. Id. P 
69(2). 
110 Id. P 69(7). Canese alleged that the Stroessner family had allowed Wasmosy to assume the chairmanship 
of CONEMPA, the consortium that enjoyed a Paraguayan monopoly of the principal civil works of Itaipu. Id. 
In another interview Canese alleged that “in practice, Mr. Wasmosy was the Stroessner family's front man in 
CONEMPA, and the company transferred substantial dividends to the dictator.” Id. 
111 Id. P 69(8). Other directors of CONEMPA filed a criminal complaint against Canese for defamation. Id. P 
69(10). 
112 Id. P 2. This restriction that could be lifted only under extraordinary circumstances.  
113 Id. P 5. 
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sanctions against Canese.114 When the State failed to do so, the Commission referred the 
case to the Inter-American Court. While the case was pending before the Inter-American 
Court, the Supreme Court of Justice of Paraguay annulled the judgment against Canese and 
absolved him of guilt.115 The Inter-American Court subsequently issued a decision holding 
that Canese's right to freedom of expression as protected by the American Convention had 
been violated.116 The Inter-American Court held that criminal prosecution for defamation 
was unduly restrictive for statements made in the context of political campaigns.117  
 
In Palamara Iribarne, a former military intelligence officer who had written a State-
censored book on military intelligence also had been convicted in a Chilean military court 
of criminal defamation for comments that he made to the press about the department that 
was prosecuting his case. Following the seizure of Palamara Iribarne's book the defendant 
told the press that the office of the Naval Prosecutor “had limited Palamara Iribarne’s 
freedom of expression and had apparently tried to cover up the repression by accusing him 
of failure to follow military orders and duties.”118 He also stated that “there were reasons to 
assume that the Office of the Naval Prosecutor had forged legal documents and lied to the 
Court of Appeals when it was consulted with respect to who made the complaint that 
initiated the summary proceeding and the case number so as to avoid an unfavorable 
decision.”119 The commander of the naval zone filed a complaint against Palamara Iribarne 
                                                 
114 Id. P 10. 
115 Id. P 69(49). In annulling the sentences against Canese and absolving him of guilt, the Criminal Chamber 
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116 Id. P 108. 
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for the crime of desacato stating that Palamara Iribarne had made his statements “in highly 
offensive terms with respect to the Naval Prosecutor.”120 Although Palamara Iribarne was 
initially absolved of the crime of defamation before a military tribunal,121 he was 
subsequently convicted by another military tribunal and that decision was confirmed by the 
Chilean Supreme Court.122 The case was then brought to the Commission which found in 
favor of Palamara Iribarne, and it was then referred to the Inter-American Court. Chile 
informed the Court that it had revised its desacato law in civil courts to eliminate the crime 
of defamation against authorities.123 The State had not, however, eliminated defamation 
from the Chilean Code of Military Justice.124 The Inter-American Court held that Chile had 
violated Palamara Iribarne's right to freedom of expression because the crime of desacato 
was disproportionate and unnecessary in a democratic society.125 The Court stated that the 
law as applied to Palamara Iribarne “established disproportionate sanctions for criticizing 
the functioning and members of a State institution,”126 in that it “suppressed the essential 
debate for the functioning of a truly democratic system and unnecessarily restricted the 
right to freedom of thought and expression.”127  
 
Thus, in 2005, the Court had three opportunities to make great strides in the area of 
criminal defamation.128 The Court provided protection of freedom of expression by 
clarifying that journalists are not required to prove the truth of statements quoted from third 
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122 Id. P 63(91), (93). 
123 Id. P 63(101). 
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parties.129 The Court also determined that criminal suits for defamation and criminal 
sanctions are undue restrictions on freedom of expression when the allegedly defamatory 
statements are made about persons whose activities are within the domain of public 
interest.130  
2.5. European Countries’ Experiences on Criminal Defamation  
 
The laws of some European countries include some type of defamation or insult provision, 
but they vary widely in their scope and application. The criminal laws, which may carry 
sanctions ranging from fines to imprisonment for periods of up to six years, also differ 
from the American approach in that they generally do not consider truth to be an absolute 
defense in defamation cases. 
 
In the United Kingdom, although the crime of libel remains “on the books,” it is rarely 
prosecuted, in part because procedural rules require private plaintiffs to obtain leave of a 
High Court Judge before proceeding.131 Civil libel actions continue to provide a remedy for 
aggrieved individuals. Similarly, in countries such as Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands 
and Sweden, criminal defamation laws are almost never invoked against the press, whereas 
Austria, Spain, Greece and Turkey frequently do so.132 France, Germany and Italy also 
retain their criminal defamation laws, but they are usually interpreted narrowly.133 In 
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general, insult laws exist in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Austria, and Sweden.134 
 
In general, despite the existing laws that criminalize defamation, it is not applied in practice 
in the majority western European countries.   
2.6. Defamation in Former Soviet Union Countries.  
Former Union of Soviet Socialist Republic included free expression provisions in its 
constitutions.135 It had at least in theory, never retreated from a professed belief in the 
principles of ethnic or racial equality and freedom of expression as guaranteed by the 
Soviet Constitution.136 Of particular importance was article 50 of the former Soviet Union’s 
Constitution which guaranteed freedom of expression.137  
 
Today the situation of defamation in the former Soviet Union countries is different than the 
western European countries. There are a few former Soviet Union countries which 
abolished their criminal defamation laws, such as Moldova, Ukraine, Estonia and Georgia. 
In some of those countries the penalties are even more severely enforced than during the 
Soviet Union. According Elena Yanchukova, some of those countries, such as Belarus, 
Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have 
shown less progress toward freedom of speech and prosecuted and convicted multiple 
journalists of criminal libel in recent years. In the remaining former Soviet Republics 
                                                 
134 Defamation and “insult” writers react, A report from International PEN’s Writers in Prison Committee, 
Insult Laws in the European Union, October 2007 
135 R.D. Sacks and SS. Baron, Libel, Slander and Related Problems, second edition, 1994. 
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Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.   
137 In accordance with the interests of people and in order to strengthen and develop the socialist system, 
citizens of the USSR are guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly, meetings, street 
processions and demonstrations. Exercise of these political freedoms is ensured by putting public buildings, 
sreets, and squaries at the disposal of the working people and their organizations, by broad dissemination of 
information, and by the opportunity to use the press, television, and radio.85 
 41
namely Russia, Armenia, and Romania, criminal libel prosecutions have been brought, or 
are pending.138 
2.7. Criminal Defamation in the Context of European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR)  
 
As it has mentioned in Chapter 1.2, according to Article 10 (2) the European Convention 
on Human Rights the right to freedom of expression is not an absolute right and can be 
restricted in particular situations. Especially if there exist hate speeches or other kind of 
elements which can make incident within the country and the restriction is necessary in the 
democratic country the Court can accept the restriction. For instance, in the case of Soulas 
and others v France, the Court noted, in particular, that, ”when convicting the applicants, 
the domestic courts had underlined that the terms used in the book were intended to give 
rise in readers to a feeling of rejection and antagonism, exacerbated by the use of military 
language, with regard to the communities in question, which were designated as the main 
enemy, and to lead the book's readers to share the solution recommended by the author, 
namely a war of ethnic re-conquest. Holding that the grounds put forward in support of the 
applicants' conviction had been sufficient and relevant, the Court considered that the 
interference in the latter's right to freedom of expression had been “necessary in a 
democratic society”. It therefore concluded unanimously that there had been no violation of 
Article 10.”139 
 
Thus, the ECtHR recognizes that freedom of expression may be limited to protect 
individual reputations. However, it also stresses that defamation laws, like all restrictions 
on freedom of expression, must be proportionate to the harm done and not go beyond what 
is necessary in the particular circumstances. Criminal defamation provisions breach the 
guarantee of freedom of expression both because less restrictive means, such as the civil 
                                                 
138 Yanchukova, supra note 1, at 883-891 
139 ECtHR, Soulas and others v France, June 10, 2008, Strasbourg, France.  
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law, are adequate to redress the harm and because the sanctions they envisage are not 
proportionate to the harm done.  
 
The Court has narrowed the circumstances where scrutiny of public bodies and figures is 
defamatory. Over the past decades, the court has decided a string of cases that creates a 
hierarchy of “acceptable criticism.”140  
 
Today the Court recognizes that there are serious problems with criminal defamation. It has 
frequently reiterated the following statement, originally made in a defamation case: “The 
dominant position which the Government occupies makes it necessary for it to display 
restraint in resorting to criminal proceedings, particularly where other means are available 
for replying to the unjustified attacks and criticisms of its adversaries or the media.”141 
 
In the very first defamation case before the European Court of Human Rights, the Court 
considered that even a minor fine was a serious matter: “The penalty imposed on the 
author… amounted to a kind of censure, which would be likely to discourage him from 
making criticisms of that kind again in future… In the context of political debate such a 
sentence would be likely to deter journalists from contributing to public discussion of 
issues affecting the life of the community. By the same token, a sanction such as this is 
liable to hamper the press in performing its task as purveyor of information and public 
watchdog.”142 
2.7.1. Public officials and public figures  
 
Although the protection of others is taken into consideration in defamation cases, there 
exists different approach when the main target of defamation is politicians. There are a 
number of decisions in which the Court has distinguished between private and public 
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reputations and ruled that the extend to which the latter may be protected is more limited, 
particularly where the press is acting as ‘watchdog’ on matters of public interest. The 
leading case of ECtHR in this matter is considered Lingens v Austria.143 According to the 
Court, since it was impossible to prove the truth of value judgments, the requirement of the 
relevant provisions of the Austrian criminal code was impossible of fulfillment and 
infringed article 10 of the Convention.144 With this case, the Court thoroughly denounced 
the idea that public figures such as politicians should receive enhanced protection under 
defamation law. The Court said: “The limits of acceptable criticism are accordingly wider 
as regards a politician as such than as regards a private individual. Unlike the latter, the 
former inevitably and knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his every word and 
deed by both journalists and the public at large, and he must consequently display a greater 
degree of tolerance. No doubt, Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2) enables the reputation of others 
- that is to say, of all individuals - to be protected, and this protection extends to politicians 
too, even when they are not acting in their private capacity; but in such cases the 
requirements of such protection have to be weighed in relation to the interests of open 
discussion of political issues.”145   The similar position was taken by the court in the case of 
                                                 
143 ECtHR, Lingens v Austria, 1986, 8 EHRR 407  
144 In this case the applicant had published two articles accusing the Austrian Chancellor, bruno Kreisky, of 
protecting and helping former Nasi SS officers for political reasons. Kreisky successfully prosecuted the 
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145 ECtHR, Lingens v. Austria, 8 July 1986, Application No. 9815/82, par. 42. 
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Oberschlick v Austria.146 In another case147 the Court stated that the media must have 
greater freedom to attack public servants who abuse their positions as part of their 
watchdog role.  
In Castells v. Spain, the ECHR went a step further, establishing an even wider definition of 
permissible criticism of the government itself.148 The state had charged Castells, then a 
senator, with insulting the government in a magazine article about violence in the Basque 
Country. According to the Spanish criminal code, insulting, falsely accusing, or threatening 
the government is punishable by imprisonment from six months to twelve years.149 Finding 
for Castells, the ECHR said that a democratic government must accept more criticism than 
private individuals and politicians.150 Echoing the common law idea that governments 
cannot have reputations, the court argued governments must not bring actions to protect 
their honor.151 It distinguished these cases from potentially legitimate prosecutions to 
protect public order. Although the ECHR did not prohibit government prosecutions, it 
urged states to show restraint when instituting criminal defamation suits because of their 
“dominant position” and the need for political criticism.152 
                                                 
146 In this case an editor had run an article reporting a speech of Jorg Heider, leader of the Austrian Liberal 
Party, under the headline ‘P.S.: “Idiot” instead of Nazi’, which went on to state that this is how we would 
describe Heider. The speech had praised the Austrian ‘solders’ of the Second World War, including those in 
the SS or Wermacht, for their role as founders of the contemporary, prosperous Austrian democratic state. 
The applicant was convicted to the Austrian Criminal Code in a private prosecution brought by Heider. In 
finding a violation, the Court rejected the suggestion that in describing the politician as an ‘idiot’ he had 
overstepped the mark required for orderly discussion of matters of public interest in a democracy.   
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2.7.2. Public Interest  
As mentioned above, the Court has affirmed the principle of public officials or public 
figures in several cases and it has become a fundamental tenet of its case law.153 The 
principle is not limited to criticism of politicians acting in their public capacity. Matters 
relating to private or business interests can be equally relevant when there is an essential 
public interest regarding the case.154 For example, the “fact that a politician is in a situation 
where his business and political activities overlap may give rise to public discussion, even 
where, strictly speaking, no problem of incompatibility of office under domestic law 
arises.”155 
In statements on matters of public interest, the principle applies to public officials and to 
public servants as well as to politicians.156 Although in the case of Janowski v. Poland, the 
Court held that public servants must “enjoy public confidence in conditions free of 
perturbation if they are to be successful in performing their tasks,” this case did not require 
the Court to balance the interests of freedom of the media against need to protect public 
servants and, importantly, did not concern statements in the public interest. In the later case 
of Dalban v. Romania, the Court resolutely found a violation of freedom of expression 
where a journalist had been convicted for defaming the chief executive of a State-owned 
agricultural company.157 Regarding the public interest the court stressed: “One factor of 
particular importance for the Court’s determination of the present case is therefore the 
                                                 
153 See, for example, Lopes Gomez da Silva v. Portugal, 28 September 2000, Application No. 37698/97, para. 
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essential function the press fulfils in a democratic society. Although the press must not 
overstep certain bounds, in particular in respect of the reputation and rights of others and 
the need to prevent the disclosure of confidential information, its duty is nevertheless to 
impart – in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities – information and 
ideas on all matters of public interest.”158 
 
The Court has rejected any distinction between political debate and other matters of public 
interest, stating that there is “no warrant” for such distinction.159 The Court has also 
clarified that this enhanced protection applies even where the person who is attacked is not 
a ‘public figure’; it is sufficient if the statement relates to a matter of public interest.160 
2.7.3. Facts vs. Opinions 
 
The Court has made it clear that criminal defamation law must distinguish between 
statements of fact and value judgments.161 This is because the existence of facts can be 
demonstrated, whereas the truth of a value judgment is not susceptible of proof. It follows 
that: “The requirement to prove the truth of a value judgment is impossible to fulfill and 
infringes freedom of opinion itself, which is a fundamental part of the right to freedom of 
expression.”162 
 
In a number of cases before the Court, domestic courts had wrongly treated allegedly 
defamatory publications as statements of fact. For example, in Feldek v. Slovakia, the Court 
disagreed that the use by the applicant of the phrase “fascist past” should be understood as 
stating the fact that a person had participated in activities propagating particular fascist 
ideals. It explained that the term was a wide one, capable of encompassing different notions 
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as to its content and significance. One of them could be that a person participated as a 
member in a fascist organization; on this basis, the value-judgment that that person had a 
‘fascist past’ could fairly be made.163 
 
In the case of Grinberg v Russia, the Court noted that:”One factor of particular importance 
for the Court's determination in the present case is the distinction between statements of 
fact and value judgments. ...  It has been the Court's constant view that, while the existence 
of facts can be demonstrated, the truth of value judgments is not susceptible of proof. The 
requirement to prove the truth of a value judgment is impossible to fulfill and infringes 
freedom of opinion itself, which is a fundamental part of the right secured by Article 10. 
...There has therefore been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.”164 
2.7.4. The Defense of ‘Reasonable Publication’ 
 
It is now becoming widely recognized that in certain circumstances even false, defamatory 
statements of fact should be protected against criminal liability. A more appropriate 
balance between the right to freedom of expression and reputations is to protect those who 
have acted reasonably in publishing a statement on a matter of public concern, while 
allowing plaintiffs to sue those who have not, what might be termed the defense of 
reasonable publication. For the media, acting in accordance with accepted professional 
standards should normally satisfy the reasonableness test. This has been confirmed by the 
European Court, which has stated that the press should be allowed to publish stories that 
are in the public interest subject to the proviso that “they are acting in good faith in order to 
provide accurate and reliable information in accordance with the ethics of journalism.”165 
Applying these principles in the case of Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway, the European 
Court of Human Rights placed great emphasis on the fact that the statements made in that 
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case concerned a matter of great public interest which the plaintiff newspaper had covered 
overall in a balanced manner.166 
 
Thus the ECtHR pays huge attention to the defamation cases. It criticizes the criminal 
defamation and calls States to refrain from punishing the journalists and restricting the 
freedom of media.  
 
2.7.5. Conclusion 
 
As a result of the comparison of different countries’ experiences on criminal defamation it 
is observed that criminal defamation is not unusual even for many developed countries 
where human rights are protected properly. However in those countries those laws that 
criminalize defamation are not applied frequently. In countries such as Norway, Sweden, 
Denmark, Austria, Belgium, Portugal, Czech Republic, Germany, and Hungary there is no 
recent successful criminal convictions on defamation. In some other western European 
countries either the law on criminal defamation is not applied or it is applied but the 
freedom of expression is protected by supreme or regional courts. As it is mentioned above, 
the US has a more liberal approach to this issue.  
 
However, there are still states which have very strict approach to defamation cases. Some 
of former Soviet Union countries are also among those countries. Unfortunately, there are 
still convictions on defamation in some former Soviet Union countries such as Russia, 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan and etc. This situation restricts the freedom of expression 
in those countries and as a result there is very slow development of democracy.    
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CHAPTER III 
3.1. Laws of Defamation of the Azerbaijan Republic 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan (hereinafter Azerbaijan) is located on the western shore of the 
Caspian Sea and at the southeastern end of the Caucasus Mountains region. Azerbaijan has 
been independent of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) since 1991. It 
has an elected president, a parliament, called the “Milli Majlis” and a judicial system.167 
Azerbaijan’s Constitution was adopted on November 12, 1995.168  
 
Freedom of expression is protected in the Azerbaijan Constitution: Article 47, “Freedom of 
thought and speech,” provides that: 
(I) Everyone may enjoy freedom of thought and speech. 
(II) Nobody should be forced to promulgate his/her thoughts and convictions or to 
renounce his/her thoughts and convictions. 
(III) Propaganda provoking racial, national, religious and social discord and 
animosity is prohibited.169 
 
The limitation of free speech stated in Article 47(III) is expanded upon in other Articles. 
Articles 46, 75 and 106 of the Constitution are the basis for the statutory defamation 
provisions which have been enacted since 1995 in the Criminal and Civil Codes and then, 
subsequently, copied into the provisions of the Law on Mass Media enacted in 2001 and 
the Law on Public TV-Radio Broadcasting 2004. 
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Article 46, “Right to Defend Honor and Dignity,” is the main basis for the statutory 
defamation provisions. It provides that:  
(I) Everyone has the right to defend his/her honor and dignity. 
(II) Dignity of a person is protected by the state. 
Nothing must lead to the humiliation of dignity of human beings. 
(III) Nobody must be subject to tortures and torment, treatment or punishment 
humiliating the dignity of human beings. Medical, scientific, and other experiments 
must not be carried out on any person without his/her consent.170 
 
Article 75 of the Constitution constitutes the respect of state symbols of the Azerbaijan 
Republic – its banner, state emblem and national anthem (hymn). There is no specific 
legislative provision implementing this Article of the Constitution. 
 
Article 106 states:171  
The President of the Azerbaijan Republic enjoys the right of personal immunity. The honor 
and dignity of the President of the Azerbaijan Republic are protected by law. Article 106 is 
implemented in Article 323 of the Criminal Code which criminalises discrediting or 
degrading the honour and dignity of the President. The penalties are significantly increased 
if the same deeds are linked with an accusation of a serious crime.172 
 
Moreover, there was an amendment to the Constitution in March 2009 which has created 
challenges for journalists. According to the amendment, “it is prohibited to take a photo, 
video or record the voice of anyone without first attaining his or her agreement.”173 Despite 
the fact that this amendment was criticized by local and international legal specialists as 
well as several international organizations, it has nevertheless been implemented. After this 
amendment it has become more difficult for journalists to fulfill their responsibility by 
                                                 
170 Id. Article 46.  
171 Id. Article 106. 
172 Criminal Code, Article 323.  
173 Constitution, Article 32.3  
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using all possible opportunities because it is a challenge now to take a photo or record 
voice without permission of a target person and in this way to prepare and deliver 
comprehensive information. In addition, if a journalist publishes an article regarding any 
illegal act of any official person and put photos confirming the fact and after publication he 
is sued in a court for defamation, he can be unable to use those photos in a trial as an 
evidence to protect himself in case the other party rises the motion that those photos were 
taken without his permission. In this case the court will not accept those photos as a reliable 
evidence with accordance to the law174. Moreover, According to Article 125.4 of CPC, 
those photos can be used against the journalist as an evidence acquired with a breach of the 
law. Thus, in this way the State has made extra challenges for journalists.     
 
Freedom of information is also envisaged in the Constitution. Article 50, “Freedom of 
information,” provides that: 
(I) Everyone is free to look for, acquire, transfer, prepare and distribute information. 
(II) Freedom of the mass media is guaranteed. State censorship in mass media, 
including press, is prohibited.175 
 
Article 23 of the Civil Code provides a remedy for the dissemination of information that 
humiliates a person’s “honor, dignity and business reputation”. A similar provision is 
envisaged in the Law on Mass Media. The Law on Mass Media applies, with particular 
force, both general and specific defamation provisions to the media. Almost wholly 
repeating Article 23 of the Civil Code, Article 10 of the Law on Mass Media prohibits the 
dissemination of information through the media that humiliates the honor and the dignity of 
the citizens, or publishing material which constitutes slander.176 Also, Articles 50 and 53 of 
the Law on Mass Media place conditions on the privilege of accreditation for both local 
                                                 
174 See Article 125.2.1 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Azerbaijan Republic.  
175 Constitution, Article 50. 
176 Law on Mass Media of the Azerbaijan Republic, Article 10 
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and foreign journalists. Accreditation can be withdrawn if the journalist violates the rules 
of accreditation, dishonors the body or spreads false information about the body.177 
 
In addition, according to Article 44 of the Law on Mass Media a person, who is considered 
that his honor and dignity was humiliated, has a right to demand refutation, correction 
apology and reply through the media in respect of the published material or to apply to a 
court.178 Article 61(1) subjects an editor who refuses to comply with these remedies, 
without grounds, to unspecified administrative or criminal responsibility. The defences of 
truth or public interest available to the media under the Law on Mass Media are limited to 
specific circumstances only under Article 62.179 
 
Moreover, in March of 2009 there was an amendment to the Law on Mass Media by the 
Azerbaijani Milli Majlis.180 According to the amendment to Article 19 of the Law, the 
media organizations activities have been restricted even more. Now the Law makes courts 
competent to a media organization which is headed by a chief editor who does not have 
high education as well as those that have foreign citizenship.181  
 
Similarly, Article 8.8.8 of the Law on Public TV-Radio Broadcasting 2004 requires a 
public service broadcaster to respect the privacy, honor and dignity of the citizens. A 
breach of this provision is governed by the provisions of the Law on Mass Media.182  
 
The most problematic Law in the term of defamation is the Criminal Code which 
criminalizes the defamation. Two articles of the Criminal Code are devoted to this matter. 
Article 147 constitutes slander. It states: 
                                                 
177 Id., Article 50 and 53 
178 Id., Article 61(1) 
179 Id., Article 62 
180 Azerbaijani Parliament is called Milli Majlis 
181 Law on Mass Media of the Azerbaijan Republic, Article 19 
182 Law on Public TV-Radio Broadcasting 2004, Article 32.3. 
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147.1. Slander is distribution of obviously false information which discredit honor 
and dignity of any person or undermines his reputation in a public statement, publicly 
or in mass media shown products  
147.2. Slander committed by accusing someone in commission of serious or 
especially serious crime.  
The penalty for the first paragraph is a fine of one hundred up to five hundred of the 
nominal financial unit, or community services for the term of up to hundred forty hours, or 
reformatory services for the term of up to one year, or imprisonment for the term of up to 
six months. The second paragraph envisages more strict punishment such as reformatory 
services for the term of up to two years, or deprivation of freedom for the term of up to two 
years, or imprisonment for the term of up to three years. 
 
Article 148 is entitled insult. It states:  
An Insult is a deliberate humiliation of honor and dignity of a person, expressed in an 
indecent form in the public statement, publicly or in mass media shown product. The 
penalty is the same for the first paragraph of Article 147. In practice, these articles are 
implemented quite frequently.  
 
Despite the slander and insult provisions, there is no law on defamation as such. Although 
international organizations like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(hereinafter OSCE) and local NGOs worked on a draft law on defamation and submitted it 
to the Parliament. The draft Law contained many provisions which sought to ensure respect 
for the right to freedom of expression while maintaining protection for reputations. In 
addition to abolishing the criminal defamation provisions, the draft Law prohibited public 
bodies from bringing defamation cases, largely limited the scope of defamation to false 
statements of fact, provided for strong defences against a defamation claim and set out a 
progressive regime of remedies for defamatory statements. In some cases, the draft Law 
actually provided far-reaching protection for defamatory statements, for example providing 
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absolute protection for repeating statements made in other media or by NGOs, and even in 
some cases by individuals.183 This draft law was not accepted. 
3.2. Mass Media in Azerbaijan 
 
The number of newspapers in Azerbaijan is currently no more than 180-200 papers. 
According to their political status, the newspapers could be divided into governmental, pro-
governmental, oppositional and independent ones. The independent newspapers total about 
0.6%, oppositional – 4%, governmental and pro-governmental - 95.4%. The newspapers 
are mostly spread in the capital – Baku, much less in big cities like Sumgayit and Ganja. A 
small segment is observed in district centers. The newspapers practically do not reach the 
villages. The oppositional press is mostly spread in Baku and Sumgayit.184  
 
The television was and remains a basic information source for the population. It comprises 
98% of information distribution. There is one state, one public and 4 private TV and radio 
companies (one more was added on September 14 of 2007) among those that inform the 
whole country. Six regional TV and radio companies operate within the country. The cable 
broadcasting companies only retransmit the telecasts of the local and foreign TV channels. 
Despite the various forms of property, all the TV and Radio companies are under the 
political and financial control of the executive power.185  
There were 11 national radio broadcasters, as well as the BBC, Voice of America, and 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, all three of which were banned from FM radio by the 
government at the end of 2008. International organizations criticized this act and tried to 
                                                 
183 Article 19, Memorandum on the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Defamation, London, 2006.  
184 Leyla Yunus, Freedom of word and mass media in Azerbaijan, September 21 2007, Baku, Azerbaijan 
185 Id.  
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negotiate with the government but there is still no result. It has had a negative influence and 
today there is no independent media in the country186 
3.3. Attacks against Journalists 
 
Since 2005, several journalists have been imprisoned on dubious charges in what has been 
widely criticized as a campaign against the independent Mass Media. The majority of them 
have been convicted on articles 147 (slander) and 148 (insult) of the Criminal Code.187  
 
For instance, in 2006 the prominent political satirist Mirza Zahidov (also known as Mirza 
Sakit) was convicted for drug possession. In 2007 the editor in chief of ‘Realny Azerbaijan’ 
and ‘Gundelik Azerbaijan’ newspapers Eynulla Fatullayev was sentenced to eight-and-a-
half years of imprisonment on charges of supporting terrorism, inciting ethnic hatred, and 
tax evasion. In 2008 Ganimat Zahid, editor in chief of opposition newspaper of Azadliq, 
was sentenced to four years' imprisonment.188 And several similar cases happened.  
 
In addition to criminal prosecutions, many journalists have received ominous communiqués 
that threaten murder and/or physical attack. The first actual attack was on March 2, 2005 
with Elmar Huseynov, the senior editor of the popular weekly edition Monitor, who was 
killed at the entrance of his own house. Huseynov’s case was considered by the officials to 
be “a terrorist act” and his assailants have not been arrested. After this dramatic crime, 
other journalists were harmed in various ways. Some were kidnapped, others beaten, etc. 
All those journalists were in opposition to the government.189  
 
                                                 
186 See Reports at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119068.htm; 
http://www.rferl.org/content/US_and_EU_Oppose_Azeri_Plans_to_Drop_Radios/1339210.html 
187 Leyla Yunus, Freedom of word and mass media in Azerbaijan, September 21 2007, Baku, Azerbaijan 
188 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119068.htm 
189 Leyla Yunus, Freedom of word and mass media in Azerbaijan, September 21 2007, Baku, Azerbaijan 
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Considering the media’s essential role in a democratic society, it is vital that it be permitted 
to gather and disseminate diverse information and opinions and that its ability to do so is 
protected by the government. Democracy is essential to the defense of human rights, and 
freedom of the press is essential to the maintenance of a democracy. Where journalists who 
critically report on public affairs or governmental activities are harassed, imprisoned, or 
murdered, the government is not only intimidating or eliminating the targeted journalists, 
but also attempting to intimidate anyone who might consider investigating and reporting on 
governmental corruption, human rights abuses, or other wrongdoing. These kinds of 
activities against media violate the fundamental rights of individuals and strongly restrict 
freedom of expression.190  
 
When the State is not successful in protecting journalists, it must investigate attacks against 
journalists and prosecute the perpetrators of the crimes. According to international 
Conventions such as ICCPR and ECHR, a state has an obligation to prevent and investigate 
such occurrences, to punish their perpetrators and to ensure that victims receive due 
compensation.191 Moreover, a State’s obligation to investigate these crimes must be 
undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective.  
The State must punish the organizers of the violation as well as the individuals who carried 
it out, whether or not the perpetrators of the threats or violence are state agents. Punishment 
will operate as a force against impunity by acting as both a specific and a general deterrent. 
The State must use all legal means to combat impunity because impunity for those who 
violate the rights of journalists and the media encourages others who may commit similar 
abuses. Unfortunately, it is very usual for the Azerbaijan’s experience. It has been four 
years since Elmar Huseynov was brutally killed and there is no result of investigations and 
the perpetrators are still free. As a result of this impunity many harassments, kidnappings, 
dubious arrests and imprisonments, and other brutal crimes have been committed against 
journalists and other authors from the opposition.        
                                                 
190 See Article 19th press release of July 13, 2009 on Azerbaijan: Article 19 Deplores Harassment of Internet 
Journalists.  
191 See cases of Herrera Rubio v Colombia, 161/83, HRC; Delgado Paez v Colombia, 195/85, HRC.  
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One of the last cases was the arrest of two young internet bloggers, Emin Milli and Adnan 
Hajizade who were very active on internet and criticized the government’s policy over 
democracy, human rights, etc. In July 2009, they were bitten in the restaurant by two 
people and when they went to a police office to complain, they were arrested with an 
accusation of hooliganism. The case was considered in a first instance court and Emin Milli 
was sentenced to two-and-a-half years and Adnan Hajizade two years of imprisonment. All 
civil society, including international organizations such as the CoE, the OSCE, the Human 
Rights Watch, the Amnesty International, Article 19 as well as several countries such as the 
US, Germany, Norway etc. criticized this act of government and asked for the immediate 
release of young bloggers from the Azerbaijani Government, there has been no result. 
According to local NGOs’ and international organizations’ reports, there was no evidence 
in the case proving bloggers’ guilt and it proved that they were arrested for their 
oppositional public activity.192 
 
So, the last event reproved that the Azerbaijani government is ready to arrest anyone, 
including young intellectual people, in order to restrict the free expression.   
3.4. Attacks to Newspapers, independent TV channels and radios 
 
Government entities have been responsible for a concerted campaign to eliminate state 
criticism from the media. On November 24, 2006 the following Mass Media and journalist 
organizations were forcefully removed from the building which belonged to the editorial 
office of the “Azadliq newspaper”: the newspaper “Azadliq”, “Bizim Yol”, Informational 
Agency of TURAN, the union of journalists called “Yeni Nesil”. The act was implemented 
with the decision of the court on the lawsuit of the Executive Power of the Baku city. The 
                                                 
192 See: http://www.article19.org/pdfs/letters/azerbaijan-letter-regarding-emin-milli-and-adnan-hajizade.pdf, 
https://wcd.coe.int//ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=PR839(2009)&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&BackColorIntern
et=F5CA75&BackColorIntranet=F5CA75&BackColorLogged=A9BACE, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/nov/131798.htm   
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removal was conducted immediately after (within an hour) the announcement by the first 
instance court to conduct the raid which was against law.  
 
The attempt of the private TV and Radio Company ANS to operate independently was 
unsuccessful. The operation of this company was halted in 2006. The justification of the 
State was the licensing of the broadcaster. The government stated that validity period of the 
broadcast license had expired. However, the same time limit applied to the other TV 
channels, but the same rule was not applied to those channels. The operation was 
recommenced after tedious negotiations with the participation of western intermediaries. 
The oppositional representatives disappeared from the TV and Radio air of ANS over the 
past months and criticism concerning the highest ranks was softened.193 
On December 30 2008, the National Television and Radio Council (NTRC) began 
prohibiting broadcasts of Voice of America, Radio Liberty, and the BBC on national 
television and FM radio frequencies. The NTRC also closed Russian-owned Europa Plus, 
which played mostly pop music. Without these international broadcasters on national 
television and FM radio frequencies, the public no longer had access to unbiased news 
through any widely accessible broadcast media.194 Despite numerous negotiations between 
the Council of Europe, the US State Department, Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, European Union and other international organizations and the 
Azerbaijani government, the broadcasting of the radio stations has not been restored. It has 
strictly restricted access to the independent media.   
However, the State has an obligation to develop pluralism and the free flow of information 
and ideas to the public. The main way of this is the independent media. This obligation 
makes states to refrain from interference of broadcasters’ freedom of expression. Although 
licensing of broadcasters is necessary to ensure the orderly use of the airwaves, licensing 
                                                 
193 See Article 19th press release of July 13, 2009 on Azerbaijan: Article 19 Deplores Harassment of Internet 
Journalists.  
194 The US Department of State’s Report on Azerbaijan, 2008 (available at: 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119068.htm ) 
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procedures are governed by the guarantee of freedom of expression and they may not, as a 
result, be used as a vehicle for government control over broadcasters, including state-
funded broadcasters. 
 
The bodies which exercise regulatory or other powers over broadcasters, such as broadcast 
authorities or boards of state-funded broadcasters, must be independent. This principle has 
been explicitly endorsed in a number of international instruments. 
 
Several Declarations adopted under the auspices of UNESCO note the importance of 
independent public service broadcasting organisations. The 1996 Declaration of Sana’a 
calls on the international community to provide assistance to state-funded broadcasters only 
where they are independent and calls on individual States to guarantee such independence. 
The 1997 Declaration of Sofia notes the need for state-owned broadcasters to be 
transformed into proper public service broadcasting organisations with guaranteed editorial 
independence and independent supervisory bodies. 
 
One of the most important documents on this matter is Recommendation No. R(96)10 on 
the Guarantee of the Independence of Public Service Broadcasting, passed by the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The very name of this Recommendation 
clearly illustrates the importance to be attached to the independence of public service 
broadcasting organisations. The Recommendation notes that the powers of supervisory or 
governing bodies should be clearly set out in the legislation and these bodies should not 
have the right to interfere with programming matters. Governing bodies should be 
established in a manner which minimizes the risk of interference in their operations, for 
example through an open appointments process designed to promote pluralism, guarantees 
against dismissal and rules on conflict of interest. 
 
 60
3.5. Court’s experience on defamation  
As mentioned above there are huge problems in the field of freedom of expression and 
independent mass media in the country. One of the main reasons of this problem is that 
there is no independent judicial system in the country.195 Despite the fact that judges are 
selected for life, the selection/interview process of judges as well as punishment and award 
processes of judges are implemented by the Judicial Legal Council (hereinafter the JLC). 
The head of the JLC is the Ministry of Justice which is the part of executive power.196 
Therefore, judges are not absolutely independent from the executive power. As majority of 
plaintiffs in defamation cases are the officials of the executive power, their claims are 
satisfied in the most of cases.197   
 
One of the most problematic issues in the courts’ experiences is that main elements of 
defamation are not investigated and taken into consideration during trial investigation. 
Especially important matters like public interest, public officials as plaintiffs, necessity in a 
democratic society, and proportionality have no attention paid to them.  
3.5.1. The matter of public interest.  
 
In many cases, the article in question which led to a defamation case drew a huge public 
interest. However, courts did not pay attention to this matter and in many cases judges did 
not even discuss the public interest issue.  
 
For instance, in the case of Ministry of Defence v “Azadliq” newspaper, the article that was 
considered defamatory, discussed the issue of lack of food and hard circumstances in the 
military in Azerbaijan. This issue drew significant public interest. However the court did 
not touch upon this matter and fined the “Azadliq” newspaper for 10.000 AZN (11.900 
                                                 
195 See 2008 report of US State Department on Azerbaijan  
196 See the Law of the Azerbaijan republic on Courts and Judges.  
197 Leyla Yunus, Freedom of word and mass media in Azerbaijan, September 21 2007, Baku, Azerbaijan 
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Euros).198  
 
In the other case of Heydar Babayev (Minister of Economic Development) v “Azadliq” 
newspaper, the article was about the participation of Azerbaijani high-ranking officials at 
the wedding of two very well-know people – Metyu Braiza, the representative of the US in 
the South Caucasus and Zeyno Baran. The article was about how the Azerbaijani officials 
financially supported the wedding of Mr. Braiza and Mrs. Baran. There was a huge public 
interest regarding this case. Again public interest was not taken into account. In addition 
the court did not conduct any investigation to determine if the information was true or not. 
Mr. Babayev’s claim was satisfied by the court and obliging the newspaper to refute.  
 
Since Azerbaijan has ratified the ECHR in 2002 there are only a limited number of 
judgments on Azerbaijan from the European Court of Human rights. Only one of them is 
on defamation, with the Court recognizing a violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression) 
of the Convention. This case was of Mahmudov and Agazade v. Azerbaijan.199 In its 
holding, the European Court emphasized the public interest issue.200  
 
The Court noted that the article discussed a number of issues concerning the current 
problems in the agricultural sector. As such, the subject matter of the article constituted a 
matter of general interest. As a result, the European Court held that the article did not 
                                                 
198 Ministry of Defence v “Azadliq”. 
199 ECtHR, Mahmudov and Agazade v. Azerbaijan, December 18, 2008, Strasbourg, France  
200 In Mahmudov and Agazade v. Azerbaijan the applicants were the editor and a journalist for the newspaper, 
Müxalifat. In April 2003 the newspaper published an article entitled “Grain Mafia in Azerbaijan” under a 
pseudonym of the second applicant. The article was accompanied by a picture of J.A., who was a member of 
the National Academy of Sciences, a well-known expert in agriculture, and a member of the Azerbaijani 
Parliament. The article generally spoke about a number of problems in the country's agricultural sector. It also 
appeared to imply, among other things, that J.A. was in charge of certain experimental crops in several 
agricultural regions. J.A. filed a criminal complaint. The national court convicted the applicants of defamation 
and insult and sentenced each applicant to five months’ imprisonment and, at the same time, exempted them 
from serving their sentences.  
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constitute defamation.  
 
Despite the case by the European Court, Azerbaijani Courts continue to ignore the issue of 
public interest and, in so doing, violates Article 19 of the ICCPR and Article 10 of the 
ECHR.  
3.5.2. Fact or opinion  
 
As mentioned above, it is very important to differentiate fact from opinion.201 
Differentiation of these two elements is decisive in a defamation case. Unfortunately, the 
national courts do not take into consideration if the statement is a fact or value judgment, 
and if the fact is true or false.  
 
The case of Zardusht Alizade involved one of the leaders of a democratic and anti-
communist movement in Azerbaijan. The defendant had published an article where he 
referred to certain alleged crimes committed by officials of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs,202 as well as other negative cases within the Ministry and called this Ministry a 
“crime nest”. The domestic court on the first instance partially satisfied the plaintiff’s claim 
without justifying how the statement damaged the plaintiff’s honor and dignity. Both the 
appeal and supreme courts agreed with the judgment of the first instance court.  
 
In this case, to have satisfied international Human Rights standards the court should have 
taken into consideration that the defendant referred to the criminal case of the officials of 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs which made a huge resonance in the country and all crimes 
committed by that criminal enterprise were, in fact, proven in court. Moreover, in referring 
                                                 
201 See Chapter 1.3.6(f) 
202 He mainly stated the case of Haji Mammadov and others. In that case Haji Mammadov was the head of 
the department of investigation of grave crimes of Ministry of Internal Affairs. He and other people under his 
authority committed some grave crimes such as murder, kidnapping, theft and etc. during ten years and they 
were arrested only after ten years. 
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to these negative matters the author had merely stated his own opinion on negative acts and 
criminality of the Ministry.  
 
Another case where the court did not take into consideration the differences between fact 
and value judgments was the case of Rafig Tagizade and Samir Sadagatoglu. On 1 
November 2006, a small Azerbaijan newspaper, Sanat, published an article entitled 
‘Europe and Us’ comparing European and Islamic traditions in which it was suggested that 
Islam had hindered progress in the development of Muslim states such as Azerbaijan. The 
main point of the article constituted the author’s opinion on two religions which alleged 
Christianity superior to Islam. This article led to outrage among Muslim conservative 
groups and the subsequent arrest of the newspaper's editor Samir Sadagatoglu, and the 
author of the article, Rafiq Tagi (also referred to as Taghizade). They were charged with 
Article 283 of the Criminal Code, inciting national, racial and religious enmity.   
The decision of the Court was a violation of Tagizadeh’s and Sadagatoglu’s rights to 
freedom of expression. First of all, the court did not take into account a very important 
issue that all statements made in the article were the opinion of Tagizade. 
 
In the Lingens case, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Austrian courts 
violated the European Convention's provision on freedom of expression when these courts 
held that value judgments and personal opinions were defamatory under domestic law. In 
that case, an Austrian journalist had been convicted in the domestic courts for using the 
expressions “the basest opportunism,” “immoral,” and “undignified” in reference to the 
Chancellor of Austria.203 The European Court of Human Rights found that the statements 
were not defamatory, reasoning that “a careful distinction needs to be made between facts 
and value-judgments. The existence of facts can be demonstrated, but the truth of value-
judgments is not susceptible of proof.”  
 
                                                 
203 ECtHR, Lingens v. Austria, App. No. 9815/82, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 407, PP 22, 45 (1986). 
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Moreover, the arrest and imprisonment of the newspaper’s editor was not acceptable 
because he was on vacation when the article was published. Even if he was in his office he 
should not have been involved in the process. In Lionarakis v. Greece,204 the European 
Court stressed that the Greek decision holding the journalist and coordinator of a radio 
program liable for the statements of a speaker intervening during his program was in 
breach of freedom of expression.205  
 
A comparison of the international standards to Azerbaijani practice demonstrates that the 
domestic courts are not in compliance with Human rights obligations by allowing 
defamation proceedings based on personal opinion statements.    
 
3.5.3. Public official or public figure.  
 
In Azerbaijan almost in all defamation cases against journalists and other authors involved 
plaintiffs who were public officials. This includes to all above mentioned cases. These 
governmental officials include Minister of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Head of 
Baku Executive Power, officer of municipality, etc.206 However, this status of plaintiffs has 
had no effect on the court’s evaluations of the cases. In almost all of these cases the 
plaintiffs prevailed.    
 
                                                 
204 ECtHR, Leonarakis v Greece, June 5, 2007, Strasbourg, France  
205 Mr. Lionarakis was a journalist, coordinator and presenter of a radio programme on politics broadcast live 
on public radio ERT. In 1999, during a debate on Greek foreign policy, a speaker criticised certain public 
personalities. Mr Lionarakis was held liable for insult and defamation on the ground that, as the coordinator 
of the programme, he should have prevented or at least interrupted the expression of the controversial 
statements. He had to pay a fine of over 41,000 euros. The European Court of Human Rights held 
unanimously that there had been a violation of article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention 
of Human Rights. It considered that the journalist and coordinator of a live programme on politics could not 
be held liable in the same way than the person who had made the defamatory statement. The Court also 
criticized the minimum threshold for compensation contained in the Greek law. 
206 Id.  
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This issue was stressed by the ECtHR in the case of Agazade v Azerbaijan as well. 207 The 
Court pointed out that: “the article contained assertions relating directly to J.A.,208 whose 
full name was mentioned once in the article and whose picture accompanied it. The article 
also made an indirect reference to J.A. by the phrase “the certain known person”. It is 
sufficiently clear from the article’s context that the latter phrase also referred to J.A. In 
view of the fact that J.A. was a prominent politician and scientist, the Court reiterates that 
the limits of acceptable criticism are wider as regards a public figure, such as a politician, 
than as regards a private individual. Unlike the latter, the former inevitably and knowingly 
lays himself open to close scrutiny of his words and deeds by journalists and the public at 
large, and he must consequently display a greater degree of tolerance.”  
 
Despite this decision of the ECtHR over Azerbaijan, unfortunately, still public figures win 
cases on defamation against journalists in courts.  
3.5.4. Proportionality and necessity in a democratic society.  
 
In many defamation cases the defendants have been imprisoned. For instance, in the case of 
Eynulla Fetullayev, Rafig Tagi, Samir Sadagatoglu journalists were imprisoned and some 
of them remain in custody. However, as mentioned above,209 it was emphasized by the 
international courts several times that this penalty is not proportional and necessary in a 
democratic society. Imprisonment is a huge threat to the freedom of expression. It 
endangers free media and is a negative influence on independent journalism.  
  
In the case of Eynulla Fatullayev, the outspoken founder and the editor-in-chief of two 
newspapers—Realny Azerbaijan and Gundelik Azerbaijan—was sentenced to two-and-a-
half years in prison on charges of libel and insult for an internet posting blaming 
Azerbaijanis for a 1992 massacre in Nagorno-Karabakh. Fatullayev denied writing the 
                                                 
207 ECtHR, Mahmudov and Agazade v. Azerbaijan, December 18, 2008, Strasbourg, France 
208  J.A. was a plaintiff who was a parliamentarian and the president’s uncle. 
209 See Chapter 1.2. 
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posting. In 2007, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of National Security pressed additional charges 
against him for terrorism and inciting religious and ethnic hatred for articles printed in 
Realny Azerbaijan. Further, tax evasion charges were filed against him. Both newspapers, 
which had the largest circulations among print outlets in the country, were effectively shut 
down after Emergency Ministry and National Security Ministry personnel evicted staff 
from the papers’ premises, confiscated computer hard drives, and sealed the office shut.210  
 
As discussed above211 the right to freedom of expression is not an absolute right and it can 
be restricted in some circumstances such as the protection of national security, or of public 
order, or of public health or morals, etc. However the principals of proportionality and 
necessity in a democratic society are important points and need to be taken into 
consideration. Even when courts find the defendant guilty of defamation, they should 
recognize that the imposition of sanctions can have a dangerous chilling effect on freedom 
of expression.  
 
The ECHR also allows for restrictions “in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals . . . .”212 Similarly, the ICCPR permits restrictions “for the protection of 
national security, or of public order, or of public health or morals.”213 The European Court 
of Human Rights and the UNHRC have developed jurisprudence to determine whether 
interference with freedom of expression is justified on grounds concerning national security 
and related factors.214 The jurisprudence of both bodies incorporates the same three 
elements set forth in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court when it considers the 
legitimacy of any restriction on freedom of expression.  
                                                 
210 Human Rights Watch World Report 2008, available in http://faliyev.org/en/news/show/785   
211 See Chapter 1.2  
212 European Convention, supra note 37, art. 10(2). 
213  ICCPR, supra note 37, art. 19(3)(b). 
214 ECtHR, Halis v. Turkey, 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3, P 134; Kim v. Republic of Korea, U.N. Human Rights 
Commission, CCPR/C/64/D/574/1994, 64th Sess. (Jan. 4, 1999). 
 67
 
Enforcement bodies have focused largely on the third element of the “necessity” of the 
restriction when holding that the restriction contravened the State's obligations under 
international law.215 National security laws are often drafted in broad and unspecific terms 
which could allow for State enforcement for any speech or activity which criticizes or can 
be viewed as threatening to the government in power.216 These laws, when used to stifle 
dissent, may serve as effective tools to muffle criticism of governmental policies and to 
subvert democracy. 
 
The international enforcement bodies that oversee State compliance with human rights 
treaties must carefully scrutinize State arguments that an interference with freedom of 
expression is justified by such laws. When a State defends its interference with freedom of 
expression on national security grounds, the State should be required to “specify the precise 
nature of the threat allegedly posed by the author’s exercise of freedom of expression.”217 
The State is also required to explain specifically why the interference is necessary to 
protect national security or public order.218  
 
State reliance on these grounds must be carefully scrutinized. When Turkey attempted to 
justify its interference with journalists’ rights to freedom of expression on national security 
grounds, the European Court of Human Rights resolved the journalists’ complaints against 
the State by applying the reasoning in the above-mentioned paragraph.219 In Halis v. Turkey 
the Turkish government had imprisoned a journalist for publishing a book review that 
expressed positive opinions about aspects of the Kurdish separatist movement. The 
journalist was convicted domestically of violating the Turkish Prevention of Terrorism Act 
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through the dissemination of propaganda about an illegal separatist terrorist organization.220 
When the journalist filed a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights, the State 
defended that its restriction was necessary to protect national security. The Court found that 
the restriction was made pursuant to Turkish law and that in view of the sensitive security 
situation and the use of violence by a separatist movement in Turkey, the measures taken 
by the government had the legitimate aim of protecting national security and public 
safety.221 The Court did not find, however, that the conviction and suspended sentence of 
the journalist were proportionate to the interference with his freedom of expression.222 
Thus, the European Court of Human Rights held that the restriction was not necessary in a 
democratic society and that it, therefore, violated the journalist’s right to freedom of 
expression.  
 
Similarly, in Sener v. Turkey, before the European Court of Human Rights, the owner and 
editor of a weekly Turkish paper was convicted of “disseminating propaganda against the 
State” for publishing an article that referred to the military attacks on the Kurdish 
population as genocide.223 Turkey again defended its interference with freedom of speech 
on national security grounds because, in its view, merely by speaking negatively of the 
violence against the Kurdish population, the applicant had “incited and encouraged 
violence against the State.”224 The European Court of Human Rights held that the State had 
violated the applicant’s right to freedom of expression because the conviction of the editor 
was not proportionate to the interference with his freedom of expression. 
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Returning to the case of Agazade v Azerbaijan,225 the ECtHR also stressed that sentence of 
imprisonment had contravened the principle that the press had to be able to perform the 
role of a public watchdog in a democratic society.226 The Court also held that the criminal 
sanction imposed on the applicants had amounted to a disproportionate interference with 
their freedom of expression and, in breach of Article 10, could not be regarded as 
“necessary in a democratic society”.227  
 
The U.N. Human Rights Committee regularly criticizes states for maintaining penal 
sanctions. Since 1994, it has expressed concern about the possibility of custodial sanctions 
in different countries.228 For instance, it held that South Korea had contravened the 
ICCPR’s provision on freedom of expression when it convicted and imprisoned a South 
Korean activist for criticizing the government of South Korea and advocating national 
reunification.229 The government had convicted the complainant of violating its National 
Security Law.230  
 
In addition, in many defamation cases in Azerbaijan, journalists and media institutions 
were imposed with large fines. For instance, in one of the cases of “Azadliq” newspaper, 
the compulsory payment was 1000 AZN (1190 Euro), in the other case of “Azadliq” 
newspaper the compulsory payment was 20.000 AZN (23.800 Euro). Again in another case 
against “Azadliq” newspaper the amount of compulsory payment was 5.000 AZN (5620 
Euro). In the case of the newspaper “Yeni Musavat” and its employees Rey Karimoglu and 
Sabuhi Mammadli, the amount of ordered compensation was 2.000 AZN (2380 Euro). In 
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the case of Eynulla Fatullayev the amount was 20.000 AZN (23800 Euro). Similar 
examples are numerous.  
  
All of these fines were charged not for material damage, but for assumed moral damage. 
The reason and the amount of the fines was not articulated in any of the case. In most 
cases, courts didn’t even take into the account whether the fined journalists and media 
institutions were able to pay this amount or to what extent this high amount of fine could 
damage their normal work. 
 
This also was not proportional and necessary in a democratic society.  
 
The failure of Azerbaijani courts to uphold internationally accepted human rights standards 
with regard to defamation has substantially degraded the enjoyment of free expression, 
especially the ability of the media to fulfill the population’s freedom to information.  
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4. Conclusion  
As discussed at the beginning of the paper, criminal defamation exists in many countries. 
Some countries do not put into practice this law, while others do. Criminalization of 
defamation presents a huge challenge for the freedom of expression. As freedom of 
expression is one of the most important rights for the development of democracy in any 
society, this right must be protected. Therefore, criminal defamation has been widely 
condemned by international opinion all over the world. Particularly the common premise is 
that defamation should not be a criminal offence because jailing journalists has a chilling 
effect on free speech.  
 
Criminal defamation is not a justifiable restriction on freedom of expression. The practice 
shows that in many countries governments use the criminal defamation to restrict free 
media and keep all situations under control by punishing journalists and other authors. In 
these countries, criminal defamation starts working when any criticism is made of the 
government or its policy, or corruption, or critique of internal or foreign policy of the 
government, etc. However, journalists have a right to express their opinions and provide 
society with different facts. In addition, the population of a country has the right to receive 
independent and transparent information from the media. By criminalizing defamation and 
arresting journalists, a state violates both sides’ rights. As a result, democracy is harmed.  
      
Unfortunately, this negative practice can be observed in Azerbaijan today. The Azerbaijani 
government should be realistic in this regard and recognize the importance of the right to 
freedom of expression of journalists and non-journalists. It should also take into account 
that criminal defamation laws intimidate individuals from exposing wrongdoing by public 
officials and such laws are therefore incompatible with the freedom of expression.  
 
In order to comply with international standards, the Azerbaijani government should take 
the necessary steps to improve the freedom of expression. First of all, criminal defamation 
law should be abolished and a civil defamation law should be adopted. It is well established 
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that the guarantee of freedom of expression requires States to use the least restrictive 
effective remedy to secure the legitimate aim sought. This flows directly from the need for 
any restrictions to be ‘necessary’; if a less restrictive remedy is effective, the more 
restrictive one cannot be ‘necessary’. In its judgment in Castells v. Spain, the European 
Court struck down a criminal defamation provision, stressing that restraint should be used 
in resorting to the criminal law, “particularly where other means are available for replying 
to the unjustified attacks and criticisms of its adversaries or the media”.231 The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights has put the matter even more clearly: “If there are 
various options to achieve a compelling governmental interest, the one that least restricts 
the right protected must be selected.”232 So, as civil defamation laws have been effective 
throughout the rest of the world, there is no justification for criminal defamation laws.   
 
Although decriminalization is important, it does not resolve all problems. Political will in 
this regard is also important. The State should be interested in the protection of free 
expression and its implementation mechanism. If there is a political will, it is possible to 
have free expression even with the criminal defamation on books, as is the case in the 
aforementioned European countries as well as the United States. There are criminal 
defamation laws in these countries that either are not applied in practice or are applied very 
rarely. If the Azerbaijani government were eager to improve the democracy in the country, 
it would adopt this restrictive approach.     
 
Another important step that the Azerbaijani government should take concerns the issue of 
arrested journalists. In this regard, the State should reconsider these cases and free all 
journalists who were imprisoned for defamation. Prison sentences, suspended prison 
sentences, suspension of the right to express oneself through any particular form of media, 
or to practice journalism or any other profession, excessive fines and other harsh criminal 
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penalties should never be available as a sanction for breach of defamation laws, no matter 
how egregious or blatant the defamatory statement. The government must realize that the 
objective is democracy, not retribution for alleged damage to reputation.   
  
The final important change needed is the abolition of impunity. In order to protect 
journalists and stop crimes against them, the State must find and prosecute the perpetrators 
of the murder of Elmar Huseynov, the editor of the journal of ”Monitor”. Other 
perpetrators of various crimes against journalists should be punished as well. Otherwise 
danger against journalists and free expression will continue. Threats against independent 
media, TV, radio channels, newspapers, and magazines should be stopped. Only in this 
way will democracy be established in the country.  
 
International standards for freedom of expression and the issue of defamation have 
demonstrated that a tolerant line between expression and defamation leads to a functional 
democracy. Only when Azerbaijan adopts these standards will the government enable the 
country to proceed toward truly free expression and, with it, a truly democratic country.  
 74
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